South Carolina Law Review
Volume 69

Issue 2

Article 3

Winter 2017

The Secrets of Corporate Courtship and Marriage: Evaluating
Common Interest Privilege When Companies Combine in Mergers
Jared S. Sunshine

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jared S. Sunshine, The Secrets of Corporate Courtship and Marriage: Evaluating Common Interest
Privilege When Companies Combine in Mergers, 69 S. C. L. REV. 301 (2017).

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Sunshine: The Secrets of Corporate Courtship and Marriage: Evaluating Commo

THE SECRETS OF CORPORATE COURTSHIP AND MARRIAGE:
EVALUATING COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE WHEN COMPANIES
COMBINE IN MERGERS

Jared S. Sunshine*
I.

INTRODUCTION..................................................302

II.

THE POSSIBILITIES
CONCERNS

III. GOING

TO

THE

OF PRIVILEGE AMONGST
MULTIPLE
.......................................................

ALTAR:

THE

ACCRETIVE

PRIVILEGE IN MERGERS

TIMELINE

306

OF

..........................................

312

A.
B.
C.
D.

Independent Operators
........................
...... 313
Due Diligence Subject to a Non-DisclosureAgreement...............317
Negotiation and Execution of a Merger Agreement.....
..... 322
Obtaining Regulatory Approval Pursuant to a Merger
Agreement
................................
........ 326
E. Litigation in Defense of the Transaction......................331
F. Consummation
...............................
..... 336
IV. DOMESTIC QUARRELS: DISAGREEMENTS
PARTIES........................................................341

A.
B.
V.

TRANSACTIONS

PRIVILEGE IN FAILED
.................................................

351

The Subsequent LitigationException...........................353
Analyzing Erstwhile Allies in Opposition ............
..... 357

VI. CORPORATE PRENUPS:
DEFENSE AGREEMENTS

A.
B.

MERGER

DistinguishingCommon from Non-Common Interests.................342
The Rule Against UnilateralWaiver............................347

BREAKING OFF THE ENGAGEMENT:

A.
B.

BETWEEN

COMMON

INTEREST AND JOINT
..........................................

360

Bolstering the Joint PrivilegeAgainst Outsiders......
......
361
Protectingthe Partiesin Subsequent AdversarialLitigation........ 366

VII. THE CONCEIT OF CORPORATE MARRIAGE .........................

369

* J.D., cum laude, Fordham University School of Law, 2008; B.A., Columbia College of
Columbia University in the City of New York, 2004. The views expressed in this Article are
the author's alone and do not represent those of the abovesaid entities or any other.

301

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3
302

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

VIII.

CONCLUSION

........................................

[VOL. 69: 301
.......

373

The background of this case is the classic corporate love story.
Company A meets Company B. They are attractedto each other and
after a brief courtship, they merge. Investor C, hoping that the two
companies will be fruitful and multiply, agrees to pay $50 million
for the wedding. Nine months later, however, things begin to fall
apart and the combined entity declares bankruptcy. Investor Cfeels
misled. He believes that Company A knew that there were problems
with Company B but that it made the oft repeated mistake of
thinking that it would be able to change Company B for the better.
Investor C files suit in the district court and after his complaint is
dismissed, we find ourselves here. It is an old story but it neverfails
to elicit a tear. 1
1.

INTRODUCTION

As others have said before, a merger is a marriage. 2 One author added a
caveat, true of both companies and couples "hopefully between
complementary parties." 3 Whether a company is sold in whole or in part,
two entities that were previously separate unite to become one. 4 In the
classic corporate love story, the two companies will indeed complement one
another and prosper together, providing returns to their shareholders,
efficiencies to consumers, competition to the marketplace, and perhaps even
greater peace on earth for all.' Of course, as the Third Circuit poignantly
limned in the epigram, the combinations of corporations are as oft star-

1.

GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).

2.
See, e.g., David T. Scheffman, Antitrust, Economics, and "Reality," in THE
ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST PROCESS 239, 247-48 (Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew N. Kleit
eds., Kluwer Acad. 1996); Martha F. Africa, Small Firm Mergers, 13 LEGAL ECON. 50, 52

(1987); David T. Scheffman, Making Sense of Mergers, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 715, 740
(1993); Carol Vogel, A Museum Merger: The Modern Meets the Ultramodern, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
2,
1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/02/arts/a-museum-merger-the-modernmeets-the-ultramodern.html; see also, e.g., GSC Partners, 368 F.3d at 232; Martin Marietta

Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1092 (Del. Ch. 2012).
3.
4.
5.

Africa, supra note 2, at 52.
See infra Section III.F.
See GSC Partners, 368 F.3d at 232; LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., No. 327-

CC, 2007 WL 2565709, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2007); Africa, supra note 2, at 52, 54, 57; see
also Martin Marietta, 56 A.3d at 1092.
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crossed as the tearful courtships of literature. 6 Whatever the success of
companies' attempts at joining, the process will undoubtedly involve
considerable exertions and sacrifices in service of an uncertain outcome. 7
Nigh inevitably, the two companies will have shared certain confidences
during the long procession to the altar.' Indeed, such secrets are the very
predicates that allow the couple to confirm whether their marriage will be a
happy one. 9 Some of those secrets may be of the legal variety, subject in the
first instance to evidentiary privilege from discovery. 'o Yet prior to the
transaction closing, the companies are separate and competing entities,
potentially jeopardizing the protected status of legal confidences when they
are shared." Such confidences may be precious or harmful to the
companies, singly or together, if disclosed more broadly or used outside the
context of the transaction.12

&

6.
Cf WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET act i, sc. i.
(illustrating a classic example of star-crossed courtship).
7.
See Africa, supra note 2, at 57 ("And, as in a marriage, sensitivity and hard work are
required to make the unit mature and flourish, even if all the right elements are there at the
outset.").
8.
See Africa, supra note 2, at 52; Richard B. Kapnick & Courtney A. Rosen,
Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate Transactions and Review of Board
Committee Actions, 3 BLOOMBERG CORP. L.J. 543, 550 (2008); Anne King, Comment, The
Common Interest Doctrine andDisclosures DuringNegotiationsfor Substantial Transactions,
74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411, 1411 (2007); Michael C. Naughton, Gun-Jumping and Premerger
Information Exchange: Counseling the Harder Questions, 20 ANTITRUST 66, 66 (2006).
9.
Africa, supra note 2, at 52-54; Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 550; King, supra
note 8, at 1411; Naughton, supra note 8, at 66; see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch
Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308,311 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 336-37 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev'd, 27 N.Y.3d 616 (N.Y.
2016).
10. See Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 550; King, supra note 8, at 1411; Joseph B.
Crace Jr., Britt K. Latham & Virginia M. Yetter, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege in
M&A, LAw360 (Sept. 16, 2014, 1:28 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/577785/
preserving-the-attorney-client-privilege-in-m-a; see, e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760
F.2d 292, 293-94 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985); La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Sealed
Air Corp., 253 F.R.D. 300, 310 (D.N.J. 2008).
11. See Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 550-52; King, supra note 8, at 1411-12;
Crace, Latham & Yetter, supra note 10; see, e.g., In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d
345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007); Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 294-95; Nidec v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249
F.R.D. 575, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
12. See GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 244 (3d Cir. 2004)
("Often this tendency towards secrecy relates to a concern, that if the deal falls through, the
acquirer might use the target's secrets to better compete with it, or that the target will be
otherwise disadvantaged."); see, e.g., Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 294-95 (rejecting government
regulator seeking a company's internal legal analysis of the regulator's investigation that had
been shared with a merger partner).
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Happily, many courts have adopted a more expansive view of privilege
under the nomenclature of co-clients, common interest, and joint defense,
pursuant to which multiple parties can share their secrets without waiving
privilege under appropriate circumstances.1 3 But to what extent can
combining companies depend on these privileges to maintain their respective
secrets during the pendency of a merger? The answer is clearly of
considerable import to antitrust attorneys and their clients: "The greatest
push to expand the common interest privilege comes from corporate
attorneys representing multiple clients in an antitrust context."1 4 Or as a
recent practitioner's guide set forth, the relevant inquiry is "when, if ever,
communications between parties to a potential merger and their counsel are
privileged, and when, if ever, parties to a potential merger can share
privileged documents without waiving the privilege."'
This Article seeks to peruse and reconcile precedent on privilege when
companies combine, whether through a merger of equals, strategic
acquisition, or the transfer of a subsidiary.1 6 In Part II, the Article briefly
recapitulates the availability of multi-party privilege and its application to
companies as background." Part III commences the focused examination of
common interest privilege in corporate transactions, tracing the progress of a
merger and accretion of privilege rights from start to finish, distinguishing
the considerations at each stage of the process. Part IV addresses difficulties
in assessing privilege when merger parties proceed in something less than

13. See infra Part II.
14.

EDNA

SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT

PRIVILEGE

AND THE WORK

PRODUCT DOCTRINE 277 (ABA 5th ed. 2007).
15. Crace, Latham & Yetter, supra note 10.
16. In light of major differences in privilege analysis, this discussion focuses on
corporate combinations, viz. transactions involving a change of control in a company, not
merely the transfer of limited assets from one to another (though a de facto merger in which
substantially all assets are transferred would still qualify). See, e.g., King, supra note 8, at
1412 n.5. For brevity's sake, such transactions are described generically in the main text as
mergers. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in
Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1061 (2013). Similarly, references to corporations
should not be taken to exclude LLCs, LPs, LLPs, and other forms under which companies may
be organized.
17. Given the focus of this Article, the provided background on privilege is brief
indeed. Many other authors have offered admirably detailed examinations of the contours of
multi-party privilege, should further depth be desired. See generally, e.g., James M. Fischer,
The Attorney-Client Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting
Confidences While Exchanging Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631 (1997);
Grace M. Giesel, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege Should Not Protect
Communications in the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 475 (2012); Katharine
Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not
Work andHow Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 77-78 (2005).
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lockstep, including how to evaluate disagreements and the question of
waiver. In Part V, the Article reviews a more unfortunate possibility in
mergers: what becomes of joint privilege in the event that the transaction
fails, when former allies may become adversaries? Turning to more practical
advice for practitioners, Part VI discusses a frequent mechanism for
concretizing privilege in corporate combinations, the common interest
agreement, and presents cases analyzing such writings' efficacy. Finally, in
Part VII, the Article revisits the metaphor of mergers as a marriage and what
that isomorphism can reveal about the merits of privilege in corporate
combinations, concluding in Part VIII with an appeal to the continuing value
of common interest privilege in the realization of mergers.' 8
Pace the straitlaced, the Article's fanciful conceit of comparing
interpersonal relations to corporate affiliations may seem flippant. But by
comparing the legal process preceding mergers to the lead-up to a marriage,
it is to be hoped that sometimes-dry themes can be rendered more readily
interpretable and intuitive.1 9 Analogy to matrimony is particularly apt in the
context of privilege, as the marital evidentiary protections augur some of the
difficulties that beset privilege between competing companies when they
seek to combine. 20 Indeed, this Article is hardly the first scholarly work to
draw the unsurprising parallel between corporate and interpersonal unions. 21
Courts too have found the analogy compelling.22 Companies seeking to

18. This Article represents substantial further investigation and expansion of research
presented by this author previously in parsing confidentiality amongst competing companies.
See Jared S. Sunshine, Seeking Common Sense for the Common Law of Common Interest in
the D.C. Circuit, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 833 (2016).
19. Besides their rendering dense material more intuitive, broad conceptual
isomorphisms, such as that employed here, can often reveal surprising insights, see infra Part
VII, and have been widely used in other scholarly literature. See, e.g., DOUGLAS R.
HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (Basic Books ed. 1979).
20. See infra Part VII.
21. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2; Andreas Al-Laham, Lars Schweizer & Terry L.
Amburgey, Dating Before Marriage?Analyzing the Influence of Pre-Acquisition Experience
and Target Familiarityon Acquisition Success in the "M&A as R&D" Type ofAcquisition, 26
SCAND. J. MGMT. 25, 25 (2010); Christiane Demers, Nicole Geroux & Samia Chreim, Merger
and Acquisition Announcements as Corporate Wedding Narratives, 16 J. ORG'L CHANGE
MGMT. 223, 223 (2003); Kevin J. Dooley & Brenda J. Zimmerman, Merger as Marriage:
Communication Issues in Postmerger Integration, 28 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 55, 55
(2003); Simon Mezger, Management: Three Years after the Marriage - What Makes a
Successful Merger?, 60 KEEPING GOOD COMPANIES 501, 501-03 (2008); Joanie E.
Sompayrac & D. Michael Costello, Thinking Merger? A Proper Courtship Can Avert a Nasty
Divorce, 78 CPA J. 63, 63-65 (2008).
22. See, e.g., GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir.
2004); Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1092 (Del. Ch.),
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protect their secrets in corporate courtships must navigate obstacles at least
as trying as those afflicting the affianced 23 which, as anyone planning a
wedding can attest, are formidable. 24
II.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF PRIVILEGE AMONGST MULTIPLE CONCERNS

The law recognizes certain principal privileges against court-ordered
disclosure, but only some apply to corporations. 25 In the lawyerly context,
the attomey-client privilege shields confidential communications for the
purpose of legal advice, 26 whilst the work product privilege protects
documents prepared in connection with litigation from discovery. 27 As for
other well-established protections: a corporation cannot avail itself of the
physician-patient or priest-penitent privilege, for obvious reasons; 28
longstanding precedent denies it the benefit of the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination; 29 and notwithstanding this Article's conceit,
marital privilege applies only between human spouses.30 The legal privileges

aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012); LaPoint v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., No. 327-CC, 2007 WL
2565709, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2007).
23. See infra Part VII.
24. See Aine M. Humble, Anisa M. Zvonkovich & Alexis J. Walker, "The Royal We ":
Gender Ideology, Display, and Assessment in Wedding Work, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES 3, 11 (2008);
cf GSC Partners,368 F.3d at 232.
25. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); David W. Louisell,
Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L.
REV. 101, 107-08 (1956) (listing the "principal confidential communication privileges" as
"husband-wife, client-attorney, penitent-clergyman, and perhaps to a lesser extent, patientphysician").
26. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998); Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
27. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3)(A); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-11
(1947); In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
28. To wit, a corporation as such can neither obtain medical treatment, nor seek
religious expiation. But cf Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)
(holding that the Affordable Care Act's preventative services coverage mandate for employers
substantially burdened the exercise of religion).
29. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S.
43, 69 (1906); Joseph M. Proskauer, Corporate Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 11
COLUM. L. REV. 445 (1911); see also Ramzi Abadou, High Court May Take On Corporate5th
Amendment Privilege, LAW360 (Mar. 25, 2015, 10:22 AM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/
634828/high-court-may-take-on-corporate-5th-amendment-privilege ("Since the ratification of
the Bill of Rights in 1791, the U.S. Supreme Court has never extended the privilege against
self-incrimination to corporate 'persons."').
30. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit denied even a flesh-and-blood husband and wife the
marital privilege because the husband had communicated from his workplace email system,
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are therefore the only ones that inure to artificial persons, 3' and they have
become well-trodden fixtures of modem corporate practice.32 Companies are
commonly and crucially advised by general counsel and their legal staff as
well as by outside counsel as to specific engagements. 33 There is no doubt
that qualifying corporate legal documents can enjoy either or both of the
attorney-client and work product privileges.34
As the name suggests, the archetypal posture of attorney-client privilege
involves one client and one lawyer. Attomey-client privilege doctrine has
traditionally demanded the confidentiality associated with such a tete-tete. 35 Yet long ago attorneys organized themselves into law firms, which
undoubtedly can collectively advise and defend a client subject to

thus involving a nominal third party in the exchange. See United States v. Hamilton, 701 F.3d
404, 408-09 (4th Cir. 2012).
31. This is not strictly true, given the advent of modern variations on the attorney-client
privilege for other professionals, such as auditor-client or accountant-client privilege, but these
have seen relatively little use and their long-term vitality is uncertain at best. Compare, e.g.,
Thomas J. Molony, Is the Supreme Court Ready to Recognize Another Privilege? An
Examination of the Accountant-Client Privilege in the Aftermath of Jaffee v. Redmond, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 247 (1998), with Ricardo Colon, Comment, Caution: Disclosures of
Attorney Work Product to Independent Auditors May Waive the Privilege, 52 LOY. L. REV.
115, 146 (2006).
32. See Grace M. Giesel, The Legal Advice Requirement of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Special Problem for In-House Counsel and Outside Attorneys Representing
Corporations,48 MERCER L. REV. 1169, 1182-83, 1182 n.49 (1997); John T. Hundley, White
Knights, Pre-Nuptial Confidences, and the Morning After: The Effect of Transaction-Related
Disclosures on the Attorney-Client and Related Privileges, 5 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 59, 60-62
(1992) (attorney-client); id. at 85-86 (work product); King, supra note 8, at 1420-2 1; Jared S.
Sunshine, The Part & Parcel Principle: Applying the Attorney-Client Privilege to Email
Attachments, 8 J. MARSHALL L.J. 47, 56 (2014).
33. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981); see In re Sulfuric Acid
Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 417 (N.D. Ill. 2006); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D.
508, 513 (D. Conn. 1976).
34. See Hundley, supra note 32, at 61-62, 85-86; King, supra note 8, at 1420-21; e.g.,
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 383; Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036,
1050 (D. Del. 1985); see also Attorney-Client Privilege: Does It Apply to Corporations?, 12
DEPAUL L. REV. 263, 268 (1963).
35. See Giesel, supra note 17, at 497; Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: The
Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J. 853, 853-55 (1998)
("In all formal definitions of the attorney-client privilege, whether employed in state or federal
courts, the client or the attorney must communicate with the other in confidence, and
subsequently that confidentiality must have been maintained."); see, e.g., United States v. Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Any voluntary disclosure by the
holder of such a privilege is inconsistent with the confidential relationship and thus waives the
privilege."); United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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privilege. 36 Generally no less certain was that a group of clients might avail
themselves of an attorney to collectively gain advice on a matter in the
interests of all. 37 This was particularly so in the case of co-defendants in
criminal actions, for whom shared counsel often best served the needs of all
in avoiding conviction by presenting a common front. 38 The joint
representation of the co-clients overcame the traditional requirement of strict
confidentiality between a single client and attorney, forging all clients and
their counsel into one unit.39 The right of such co-clients to rely on privilege
is thus of ancient origin and has confronted no serious opposition. 40
Subsequent evolution in privilege doctrine amongst multiple clients was
not far off. Just as with co-clients with a single attorney, the earliest case to
allow clients represented by separate counsel to confer confidentially as a
group arose in the criminal context. 4 1 In 1871, the Virginia Supreme Court
in Chahoon v. Commonwealth recognized for the first time "a right, all the
accused and their counsel, to consult together about the case and the
defence."

42

The court elaborated:

They might have employed the same counsel, or they might have
employed different counsel as they did. But whether they did the

36. Cedrone v. Unity Savings Ass'n, 103 F.R.D. 423, 429 (E.D. Pa. 1984) ("[I]t is
inconceivable that an internal memorandum between attorneys in the same office concerning
the representation of a client, utilizing confidential information provided by that client, could
be anything but protected by the privilege."); EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 273; see N.Y.
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 285 F. Supp. 868, 869 (D. Kan. 1968).
37. Giesel, supra note 17, at 522-23, 525-27 (discussing seventeenth century cases and
doctrine); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 75 (AM.
LAW INST. 2000) (discussing co-client privilege); e.g., Simpson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 494
F.2d 850, 855 (7th Cir. 1974) ("[W]here the same attorney represents two parties having a
common interest, and each party communicates with the attorney, the communications are
privileged .... ); Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co. v. H.W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823, 835 (6th Cir.
1941).
38. See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841 (1871).
39. See Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 871, 876 (1996); Giesel, supra note 17, at 519-20; cf Fischer, supra note
17, at 647-49 (examining how common interest privilege represents a similar loosening of
confidentiality requirements).
40. Giesel, supra note 17, at 479-80, 480 n.13 (citing Rice v. Rice, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.)
335, 336 (1854); Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y. (39 Sickels) 72, 76 (1881)); id. at 512-13, 512 n.176
(internal citations omitted); id. at 522-23.
41. Chahoon, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 823; see Bartel, supra note 39, at 886-88; Greg A.
Drumright & W. Rick Griffin, The Joint Defense Doctrine-Cohesion Among Traditional
Adversaries, in EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 35, 37 (Def. Res. Inst.
2008) (recognizing Chahoon as originating the privilege); Fischer, supra note 17, at 633 n.7
(same); Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 58 (same).
42. Chahoon, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 841-42.
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one thing or the other, the effect is the same, as to their right of
communication to each and all of the counsel, and as to the
privilege of such communication. They had the same defence to
make, the act of one in furtherance of the conspiracy, being the act
of all, and the counsel of each was in effect the counsel of all. 43
Although initially invoked only sporadically in the ensuing century, 44
the Chahoon right to joint defense privilege has seen widespread acceptance,
including at the appellate level, beginning about fifty years ago. 45 At the
same time, the right increasingly gained approval in civil cases as well,
notwithstanding its origin in criminal prosecutions. 46 Today, there is little
doubt that impending or actual co-litigants, whether civil or criminal, may
employ separate counsel without fear of forfeiting privilege. 47 Indeed,
codefendants may even have a constitutional right to coordinate their
positions. 48

43. Id; contra Giesel, supra note 17, at 482-83, 504-08 (arguing Chahoon erred).
44. See Giesel, supra note 17, at 483, 489, 508-11.
45. See Hundley, supra note 32, at 81 ("Although the rule's common law roots go back
to the last century, its major development occurred in the last 25 years [before 1992].") (date
of article added for context); Bartel, supra note 39, at 885-86; Drumright & Griffin, supra
note 41, at 37; see, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir. 1979);
Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1965); Continental Oil Co. v. United
States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964). Compare Giesel, supra note 17, at 508-12 (arguing
Chahoon has been misinterpreted by adopting courts), with Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 59
("[T]he joint defense privilege universally gained easy and early acceptance in the criminal
context.").
46. Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 60 & n.35 ("[O]ther courts that have considered this
issue have similarly applied the joint defense privilege to protect attorney-client privileged
communications that civil co-defendants have shared .... ). See Giesel, supra note 17, at 531
n.247, for a list of cases that illustrate the application of the joint defense privilege in civil
cases. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 287; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4,
John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
Megan-Racine Assocs., Inc. (In re Megan-Racine Assocs., Inc.) 189 B.R. 562, 571 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1995); see, e.g., Transmirra Prods. Corp. v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 572,
579 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn. 1942), overruled in part
by Leer v. Chicago, 308 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Minn. 1981).
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 2000); Bartel, supra note 39; Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 58-61; e.g., In re LTV Sec.
Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 603-05 (N.D. Tex. 1981); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[The] cooperative program of
joint defense is helpful or, afortiori,necessary to form and inform the representation of clients
whose attorneys are each separately retained."). But see Giesel, supra note 17, at 504-12.
48. See United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Bartel,
supra note 39, at 872-73 (citing United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 873 (10th Cir. 1995);
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988)); Bartel, supra note 39, at 906-10; Hundley,
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The final key advancement was the severance of the right to
confidentiality from its original wellspring in litigation. 49 Stripped of the
connection to defense or prosecution of a claim, this most modem evolution
of multi-party privilege became known as common interest, because it was
based on the parties sharing like legal interest in the privileged material.50
Common interest privilege should then apply to any attorney-client or work
product communications shared with another party pursuing the same legal
aim, regardless of the presence or absence of litigation." The majority of
jurisdictions have adopted this common interest doctrine.5 2 Some, however,
have refused to recognize common interest privilege outside the litigation
context, finding it effectively conterminous with joint defense privilege.5 3
This refusal represents a problematic minority position;5 4 regimes invoking a
litigation requirement may place gainful confidential cooperation in
jeopardy, particularly in mergers.

supra note 32, at 60 n.2. But see Giesel, supra note 17, at 548-49 (expressing guarded
skepticism).
49. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1974),
aff'd, 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976); EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 289; Fischer, supra note 17, at
635-37 (describing Duplan as the "seminal decision" in the emergence of the distinct common
interest privilege); Hundley, supra note 32, at 82-84.
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 2000) (noting no litigation requirement); EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 289-90 ("Unlike the
joint defense privilege, the common interest does not require or imply that an actual suit is or
ever will be pending. It does require, however, that a definable common interest exist.");
Fischer, supra note 17, at 635.
51. See Fischer, supra note 17, at 656 ("However, the need for legal advice is not
limited to litigation settings, and the range of parties who are interested in the resolution of a
'problem' is not limited to those who may be made co-parties or who have the legal right to
assume control of the defense or claim."); Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 76-78.
52. United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 n.6 (7th Cir. 2007); HSH
Nordbank AG N.Y. Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 71 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Federal
case law makes clear that the common interest doctrine applies even where there is no
litigation in progress."); Sunshine, supra note 18, at 854 & n.42; see also King, supra note 8,
at 1424 & n.73 ("The common interest doctrine is widely accepted in the federal courts, and by
state courts and legislatures."). But see Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 52 (writing in 2005 that
"[o]nly a handful of state and federal jurisdictions have affirmatively adopted the common
interest doctrine").
53. See Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 74-75, 74 n.91 (discussing and citing such
jurisdictions).
54. See id. at 76-78 (arguing against a litigation requirement); Sunshine, supra note 18,
at 284-85 (same).
55. See Sunshine, supra note 18; infra notes 77-81, 160-168 and accompanying text;
see also Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 76-78 (discussing problems with an unclear litigation
requirement).
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In any event, essentially every jurisdiction, state and federal, has
adopted some form of multi-party privilege, whether of broad or strict
compass.5 6 And as a rule, these privileges apply mutatis mutandis to work
product as well as attomey-client postures. 7 Just as with the underlying
attorney-client and work product privileges, companies can benefit from coclient, joint defense, and common interest privileges no less than
individuals.
The most obvious vehicle for establishing a corporate common interest
(other than alignment in litigation) is the creation of a joint venture, which
concretizes multiple companies' congruence of purpose.5 9 The joint venture
has long been held up as a paradigm of privilege: early in his term of office,
Chancellor Allen wrote that Delaware's common interest privilege is a
"recognition that a disclosure may be regarded as confidential even when
made between lawyers representing different clients if in the circumstances,
those clients have interests that are so parallel and non-adverse that, at least
with respect to the transaction involved, they may be regarded as acting as
joint venturers." 60 Otherwise, companies in the ordinary course of business
will share few, if any, legal interests sufficiently common absent litigation. 61
But the advent of a potential corporate marriage-the grandest joint venture

56. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 41, at 41-43 (showing adoption of multi-party
privilege by state and circuit courts).
57. Bartel, supra note 39, at 912-13; Douglas R. Richmond, The Attorney-Client
Privilege and Associated Confidentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron Era, 110 PENN ST. L.
REv. 381, 414-15 (2005); e.g., Doe v. United States (In re Doe), 662 F.2d 1073, 1081 (4th
Cir. 1981) ("Disclosure to a person with an interest common to that of the attorney or client
normally is not inconsistent with an intent to invoke the work product doctrine's protection
and would not amount to such a waiver."); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F.
Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd, 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976) ("The sharing of
information between counsel for parties having common interests does not destroy the workproduct privilege during the course of the litigation."). See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 14,
at 1038-46 (discussing non-waiver of work product privilege when shared with a party in
common interest, but noting that interest may be interpreted more broadly in work product
postures).
58. King, supra note 8, at 1433-34; e.g., In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d
345, 363-68 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Gulf Oil Co., 760 F.2d 292, 294-96 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1985); Cont'l Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1964);
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 514 (D. Conn. 1976).
59. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 301 ("It is obvious that the privilege applies when parties
are already engaged in litigation or a joint venture where their legal interest coincide."); see
also United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 817 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding joint
venturers "clearly within the scope of the common interest doctrine").
60. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., No. 8077, 1986 WL 3426, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar.
20, 1986).
61. See infra Section IV.A.
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gives rise to varying but vital questions of shared

III. GOING TO THE ALTAR: THE ACCRETIVE TIMELINE OF PRIVILEGE IN
MERGERS

When this love story started, it was Vulcan who was pursuing
Martin Marietta, seeking to entice a nervous wallflower to go to the
dance, after years offlirtation, but ultimate rejection ....
When the originalsuitor cooled its ardor, the once-reluctant dance
date became more enamored. As indicated, Martin Marietta'sstock
price had risen in comparison to Vulcan's. This made the threat
that Martin Marietta would be seen as the low-priced industry
target ripe for hostile taking less substantial, and it gave Martin
Mariettamore power in its dealings with its suitor, Vulcan. 63
Chancellor Allen's formulation arose in, and has fittingly been much
quoted in, the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 64 Although every
merger follows its own track and timeline, the availability of privilege
generally tends to accrete over the course of the transaction from the earliest
overtures to the final consummation of the transaction. 65 As the parties to the
transaction draw nearer to closing, an ever-greater set of their legal interests

62. This author has previously pled for more precise distinctions amongst the co-client,
joint defense, and common interest privileges. See Sunshine, supra note 18. Given the existing
confusion of terminology, to rejoin these arguments here would yield myriad asides that would
seriously, if not fatally, distract from the themes of this Article. The main text therefore refers
generally to shared privileges between allies as common interest, as it often is in mergers,
unless a point is being made anent joint defense or co-client privilege in particular.
Nonetheless, in eliding the authorities' sometimes indistinct nomenclature for the variety of
privileges under discussion, this author does not intend to endorse such imprecision. See, e.g.,
King, supra note 8, at 1423 n.69; Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 55.

63. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1093 (Del.
Ch.), aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012).
64. E.g., Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329,
335-36 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev'd, 27 N.Y.3d 616 (N.Y. 2016); 3Com Corp. v. Diamond II
Holdings, Inc., No. 3933-VCN, 2010 WL 2280734, at *3-6 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2010); Saito v.
McKesson HBOC, Inc., No. 18553, 2002 WL 31657622, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 2002); Zirn
v. VLI Corp., No. 9488, 1990 WL 119865, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993).
65.

See Crace, Latham & Yetter, supra note 10; King, supra note 8, at 1412-13.
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come into alignment, allowing the two to share their confidences under the
umbrella of common interest privilege 66:
Determinations of whether a "common interest" is adequately
"legal" or adequately "shared" by the parties are often highly
contextual. When, for example, the parties are still in early stages of
negotiations, their interests are less aligned than they would be after
a merger agreement has been signed, and closing of the transaction
is more certain. Courts have made clear that the timing of the
disclosure of the privileged information and the certainty of the
transaction will impact a determination of whether the common
interest doctrine preserves privilege or not.67
Accordingly, it makes some sense for the M&A or antitrust practitioner
concerned with privilege to conceive of the procession to the marriage altar
as a series of distinct phases, each of which has unique considerations
militating for or against the existence of common interest privilege between
the merger parties.68 Given the potential for waiver of valuable secrets, it is
essential for counsel to consider the availability of common interest
privilege before any confidences are shared. 69 And these are critical
considerations: whether privilege is upheld or denied can be the decisive
factor in a transaction's ultimate success.70
A.

Independent Operators

Prior to any formal overtures anent combination, parties to a potential
merger are independent operators, and, as such, are unlikely to share any

66. See Crace, Latham & Yetter, supra note 10; King, supra note 8, at 1412.
67. Crace, Latham & Yetter, supra note 10.
68. See id.; King, supra note 8, at 1412-13 ("The timing of the disclosure is also
relevant to the question of waiver. During the course of substantial transactions, potential
buyers conduct rigorous due diligence review, scrutinizing the seller corporation's files,
records, and financial statements to assess the transaction's risk. Disclosures during due
diligence arguably warrant different treatment than disclosures made during the initial stages
of negotiations. The parties to the contemplated transaction are less likely to have adverse
interests at this late stage of negotiations.").
69. Hundley, supranote 32, at 106-07; Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 543, 555.
70. Erik J. Olson, Gregory V. Varallo & Rudolph Koch, The Wheels Are Falling Off the
Privilege Bus: What Deal Lawyers Need to Know to Avoid the Crash, 66 Bus. LAW. 901, 901
(2011); see also Sunshine, supra note 32, at 48 (discussing generally "corporate claims of
privilege, where a single critical document from a population of millions could be the crux on
which a case turns").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

13

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3
314

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 301

common interest giving rise to a privilege." Indeed, if the potential parties
operate in the same industry, there are likely serious antitrust problems with
their sharing commercially sensitive information or cooperating at all.72
Courts regularly express concern that competitors may attempt to shield
exchanges that may run afoul of antitrust law behind a screen of privilege. 73
Such judicial skepticism may result in courts demanding more compelling
proof of commonality before affording industry collaborations immunity
from discovery. 74 Or as one privilege hombook summarized, "[t]he antitrust
context is particularly fraught with the danger that co-conspirators, once they
become co-defendants, will seek common interest protection for documents
that are in fact evidence of antitrust conspiracy." 75
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has been amongst the most
demanding, 76 limiting the application of common interest to exchanges
when the parties are aligned in litigation. 77 In the much-cited In re Santa Fe
International Corp., the court of appeals confronted several oil companies
who had shared counsel's advice regarding labor law.78 Rejecting privilege,
the court worried that the circulation of the legal memorandum might in fact
be in service of a price-fixing conspiracy, as the plaintiffs had alleged. 79
Crucially, the companies sought to ground common interest in their mutual
desire to avoid violations of antitrust law and litigation, which the Fifth

71. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
72. See Jeffrey P. Schomig, The Ability of Trade Associations to Receive Advice on
Antitrust and Other Legal Risks: Are These Communications Protectedfrom Discovery?,
BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS: ANTITRUST AND TRADE, Vol. 4, No. 6, at 1 (2011).
73. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 711-14 (5th Cir. 2001); Ambac
Assur. Co. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.Y.3d 30, 38-39 (N.Y. 2016).
74. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 514 (D. Conn. 1976) (finding
that the parties' "individual postures relevant to the antitrust discussions in point are
undefined" and directing competitors claiming common interest privilege to provide an
affidavit in defense of their claims).
75. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 302; see id at 277 ("It is precisely in such a context that
the potential for abuse is greatest. The 'common interest' privilege may be nothing but a cover
for an antitrust conspiracy."); see Bartel, supra note 39, at 879 (cataloguing others expressing
such fears).
76. See Michael Pavento, Daniel H. Marti, Tracie Siddiqui & Patrick Eagan,
Applicability of the Common Interest Doctrinefor PreservationofAttorney-Client Privileged
Materials Disclosed During Intellectual Property Due Diligence Investigations, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESK REFERENCE 353, 357 (2009).
77. See In re Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 711; see also United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510,
525 (5th Cir. 2002) (confirming In re Santa Fe).
78. In re Santa Fe, 272 F.3d at 707-08.
79. See id at 714 ("[T]he record in this case is neither clear nor indisputable with
respect to Santa Fe's motive for sending its in-house counsel's memorandum to its horizontal
offshore drilling competitors. It is possible that the disclosures were made to facilitate future
price fixing in violation of the antitrust laws, as the plaintiffs contend.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss2/3

14

Sunshine: The Secrets of Corporate Courtship and Marriage: Evaluating Commo
2017]

COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE IN MERGERS

315

'

Circuit found dispositive, citing the district court's finding that there was
"'no justification within the reasonable bounds of the attorney-client
privilege for horizontal competitors to exchange legal information, which
allegedly contains confidences, in the absence of an actual, or imminent, or
at least directly foreseeable, lawsuit."' 0 The companies' own admission
thus decided privilege against them: "In sharing the communications,
therefore, they sought to avoid conduct that might lead to litigation. They
were not preparing for future litigation." 8
Such strict holdings are understandable given courts' chariness of the
potential for competitors' collusion but present unenviable quandaries for
companies. No less an authority than the Supreme Court has recognized that
corporations must resort to counsel to ensure compliance with the law given
the complexity of modem statutory regimes.82 This is particularly so in the
antitrust context, where laypersons are not well-equipped to discern the
subtle and legally abstruse delineations between acceptable and
unacceptable conduct.83 Public policy militates strongly for affording
companies the ability to comply with antitrust law,84 and other courts have
upheld common interest privilege in the context of avoiding antitrust
violations. 85 Nonetheless, the shadow of In re Santa Fe hangs heavily over
companies contemplating whether they can maintain privilege in sharing
advice to ensure lawful behavior. 86
That said and setting aside the archetypal joint venture-7 there are
enclaves more susceptible of common interest even amongst active
competitors. Likely the most frequent occurs in the context of trade

80. Id. at 714 ("[If] the disclosures were perhaps made in the sole interest of preventing
future antitrust violations, as the defendants argue in their motion for reconsideration, ... they
hardly could be seen as the commencement of an allied litigation effort.").
81. Id. at 713 ("In the present case, Santa Fe admits in the motion for reconsideration it
filed in the district court that the communications it claims are protected by the privilege were
not made in anticipation of future litigation. Instead, the documents were 'circulated for the
purpose of ensuring compliance with the antitrust laws and minimizing any potential risk
associated with the exchange of wage and benefit information."').
82. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 398 (1981).
83. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.S.C. 1974),
aff'd, 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976) ("This court recognizes that it is not the federal
government that is primarily responsible for enforcement of the federal antitrust laws but
rather the lawyers who advise their corporate clients. Unless corporate personnel on a fairly
low level can speak to attorneys in confidence, the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws is
likely to be adversely affected.").
84. See In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886-87 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
85. See In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 407, 416-17 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
86. See, e.g., Schomig, supra note 72.
87. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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associations to which market participants subscribe for the purpose of jointly
developing and pursuing advocacy plans for legislation and administrative
policy that affects their industry." Such advocacy often involves legal
analysis contributed by or shared with the various members of the trade
association.89 Some authorities have recognized that counsel to the trade
group can consult with its members within privilege, though they differ on
whether the basis is co-client or true common interest privilege. 90 But the
doctrinal uncertainty has also yielded contrary modem cases where a shared
privilege is denied in the trade association posture. 91 Perhaps the best
conclusion is that "[t]here is no per se rule that representation of a trade
association creates an attomey-client relationship with each member of the
association, but the particular circumstances of the representation may create
an attomey-client relationship with one or more of the members." 92
Judicial recognition of common interest in such circumstances is
plausible because antitrust concerns are at their nadir anent public policy
advocacy. Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, market competitors are
permitted to collude overtly for this purpose notwithstanding contrary
antitrust rules, due to the First Amendment's proscription that Congress
make no law abridging the right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. 93 Put another way, "[t]he federal antitrust laws ... do not
regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action
from the government," even if those seeking redress are doing so for their

88. Schomig, supra note 72.
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Broessel v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp., 238 F.R.D. 215 (W.D. Ky. 2006)
(upholding common interest in trade association). Compare, e.g., Schomig, supra note 72, at 2
& n. 1 ("Several older trial court opinions have, with little analysis, held that all members of a
trade association enjoy an attorney-client relationship with the association's legal counsel."),
with Schomig, supra note 72, at 4-5 (analyzing under common interest theory), and Bartel,
supra note 39, at 878 ("Where a trade association is the client, for example in an antitrust
matter, the lawyer for the trade association may have direct communication with the
constituent members of the trade association to gather necessary information. Because the
constituent members comprise the trade association, the fate of the claims against the trade
association has a direct impact upon the continued behavior of the constituent members. It is
appropriate to extend the attorney-client privilege to govern communications between the
lawyer and the members of the trade association.").
91. See Schomig, supra note 72, at 2-3 (discussing cases declining privilege).
92. United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 129 F. Supp. 2d
327, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting N.Y.C. Ass'n of the Bar Comm. on Prof'1 & Jud. Ethics,
Formal Op. 1 (1999)).
93. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1961).
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own mercenary purposes.94 The topic of Noerr-Pennington antitrust
immunity is of course far more nuanced 95 but serves as a reminder that
independent operators-indeed, business rivals may still enjoy the benefits
of common interest in narrowly bounded circumstances, even before a
combination is contemplated.
B. Due Diligence Subject to a Non-DisclosureAgreement
Typically, the first formal step in the merger timeline is the exchange of
non-disclosure agreements so that the parties can conduct due diligence. 96
The commencement of due diligence is like a first date: the parties are
beginning to get to know one another and assess the other's character and
suitability for a longer-term relationship. 97 Unlike a social rendezvous,
however, non-disclosure agreements are a basic predicate since the due
diligence process necessarily involves the parties providing highly
confidential information so their counterparts can evaluate whether a deal is
even plausible in the first instance. 98 At this early stage, the parties are
broadly adversarial: each has a distinct interest in protecting its trade secrets
and confidences, whilst at the same time gaining the greatest possible access

94. City of Columbia, 499 U.S. at 379-80.
95. See generally, e.g., Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, Antitrust Exemptions for
Private Requests for Governmental Action: A Critical Analysis of the Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 549 (1984); Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington
Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 965 (2003).
96. See Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 543, 550; King, supra note 8, at 1414; see
also Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76, at 353-54.
97. See Africa, supra note 2, at 52 ("The parties may not perceive themselves to be
equal at the outset, but they cannot survive the merger talks through to 'marriage' unless an
equality develops."); cf Al-Laham, Schweizer & Amburgey, supranote 21; Janet LePage, The
Science and Art of Due Diligence, REAL ESTATE INSIDER BLOG (July 19, 2016),
http://blog.reincanada.com/the-science-art-of-due-diligence ("In the real estate world, due
diligence is going to get you from that first date to the point of knowing everything there is to
know about this property, including learning what you can live with and identifying those red
flags the things you most certainly cannot live with in a property purchase.").
98. See King, supra note 8, at 1414; Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76,
at 365.
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to its counterpart's files. 99 As one suitor's interest waxes, the other's may

wane, as they evaluate their respective commercial positions. 100
All things being equal, courts have viewed the execution of a nondisclosure agreement as militating in favor of common interest privilege. o
Confidentiality between attorney and client is an essential prerequisite of the
underlying attomey-client privilege,1 02 and sequestration from adverse
parties is necessary for maintenance of the work product privilege.1 03 As
such, a non-disclosure agreement generally bolsters the argument that the
parties sharing the ostensibly privileged information took reasonable steps to
maintain its confidentiality. 0 4 Certainly, a foolhardy company providing
internal documents absent a clear non-disclosure agreement could have little
claim to privilege, given that its interlocutor would be free to disseminate
what it received at will. 105

99. See JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, No. 07 Civ. 7787(THK), 2008 WL 111006, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2008); Cheeves v. Southern Clays, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 128, 129 (M.D. Ga.
1989); Africa, supra note 2, at 52; see also Blau v. Harrison (In re JP Morgan Chase & Co.
Sec. Litig.), No. 06-C-4674, 2007 WL 2363311, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007). See generally
King, supra note 8, at 1414-16.
100. See Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1093
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012).
101. See Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76, at 353-54; see, e.g., Tenneco
Packaging Specialty & Consumer Prods., Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. 98 C 2679,
1999 WL 754748, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1999).
102. See Schomig, supra note 72, at 1-2; supra note 35.
103. See Schomig, supra note 72, at 1-2; see, e.g., United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610
F.3d 129, 139-40 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
104. See Dura Global Tech., Inc. v. Magna Donnelly Corp., No. 07-cv-10995, 2008 WL
2217682, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2008); Tenneco, 1999 WL 754748, at *2; see also United
States v. Gulf Oil Co., 760 F.2d 292, 294-96 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985) (relying on strict
confidentiality provisions in upholding privilege for documents shared after a merger
agreement was signed); Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 552 ("A critical consideration in
determining whether privilege is waived is how scrupulous the parties have been in limiting
access to privileged information and in offering assurances to maintain confidentiality of the
communications.").
105. See, e.g., Brown v. Adams (In re Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp.), No. 07-04015DML, 2008 WL 2095601, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. May 15, 2008) ("[C]ertainly at a bare
minimum there must be a meeting of the minds that documents subject to attorney-client or
work product privilege are being shared in the expectation that the privilege is not being
waived by the sharing and that each party will protect the documents from disclosure or loss of
the privilege."); Libbey Glass, Inc. v. Oneida, Ltd., 197 F.R.D. 342, 347-49 (N.D. Ohio 1999);
see also Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 141 ("Nevertheless, a confidentiality agreement must be
relatively strong and sufficiently unqualified to avoid waiver. In Williams, for example, we
concluded that the government's assurance that it would maintain confidentiality 'to the extent
possible' was not sufficiently strong or sufficiently unqualified to prevent the government
from disclosing the information to a criminal defendant under Brady v. Maryland. Likewise,
we have determined that a mere promise to give the disclosing party notice before releasing
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All things are not equal in due diligence, however. Irrespective of the
presence or absence of even an airtight non-disclosure agreement, courts
seldom uphold common interest broadly in the due diligence context.1 06
Designating documents as confidential cannot protect them from discovery
if they are not subject to common interest privilege. 107 As expressed above,
the parties are self-evidently in conflict over the breadth and depth of the
information exchanged, and are engaged in a business rather than legal
decision, namely whether to enter into the merger in the first place. 108 Due
diligence still represents an exploratory phase during which the parties have
not yet committed to a joint undertaking, but rather are evaluating their
distinct commercial interests in a transaction.1 09 The regularity of quarrels
between lawyers over one party or the other's failure to provide desired
documents only serves to illustrate the reality of these distinct rather than
aligned interests. 10

Nevertheless, there are often plausible zones of common interest,
usually related to the assessment of potential legal claims or pending

documents does not support a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.") (internal citations
omitted).
106. See Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 551-52; King, supra note 8, at 1427-28
(discussing the so-called Corningapproach); Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76,
at 353 (observing that "disclosure of privileged information during a due diligence
investigation may involve risks for both parties because it can result in a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege regardless of whether the transaction is consummated"); see, e.g., JA
Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, No. 07 Civ. 7787(THK), 2008 WL 111006, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10,
2008); Corning Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223 F.R.D. 189 (D. Del. 2004); Katz v. AT&T
Corp., 191 F.R.D. 433, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Libbey Glass, 197 F.R.D. at 348-49; Cheeves v.
Southern Clays, Inc., 128 F.R.D. 128, 129 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
107. See Med. Waste Techs., L.L.C. v. Alexian Bros. Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 97 C 3805,
1998 WL 387705, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 24, 1998); Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., PLC,
508 So. 2d 437, 441-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 81-82, 82
n. 121. Note, however, that documents subject to work product privilege rather than attorneyclient privilege may well remain protected given the looser requirements of confidentiality in
that context. See EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 1038-46.
108. See JA Apparel, 2008 WL 111006, at *4; see also Blau v. Harrison (In re JP
Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig.), No. 06 C 4674, 2007 WL 2363311, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13,
2007). But see King, supra note 8, at 1437-41 (proposing presumption in favor of common
interest in due diligence because parties are comparatively committed to the transaction).
109. See, e.g., Katz, 191 F.R.D. at 438 n.6; Cheeves, 128 F.R.D. at 129. But see King,
supra note 8, at 1437-41.
110. See GSC Partners CDO Fund v. Washington, 368 F.3d 228, 244 (3d Cir. 2004)
("Although we do not mean to suggest approval of the practice, we note that it is not
uncommon for a target to be somewhat uncooperative with respect to due diligence requests
from a potential acquirer."); see also Africa, supra note 2, at 52.
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litigation."' In many such cases, courts have permitted the protection of
common interest to the two sides sharing the views of counsel to coordinate
on legal rights or the outcome of claims.11 2 This is particularly so in regard
of intellectual property, where evaluation of patents can be integral to the
deal but relies on legal conclusions as to the validity of a patent claim.11 3 In
Dura Global Technology v. Magna Donnelly Corp., a Michigan district
court endorsed common interest privilege, 114 given the company's careful
limitation of shared legal materials regarding patent claims to counsel, strict
non-disclosure pacts, and the demonstrated legal rather than commercial
motivations for the review."' Common interest is not categorically limited
to patents, of course. A New Jersey court, for example, held that shared
documents legally analyzing future asbestos liabilities were subject to the
privilege. 116
This distinction between legal and commercial is crucial." 7 In Nidec v.
Victor Co. ofJapan, the California district court helpfully clarified that it is
joint future collaboration in a combined company's litigation of claims
(patent, asbestos, or otherwise) that gives rise to the common interest;

111. See Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 550-51; see, e.g., Morvil Tech., LLC v.
Ablation Frontiers, Inc., No. 10-CV-2088-BEN (BGS), 2012 WL 760603, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
2012); La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Sealed Air Corp., 253 F.R.D. 300, 310 (D.N.J.
2008); Dura Global Tech., Inc. v. Magna Donnelly Corp., No. 07-cv-10995, 2008 WL
2217682, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 27, 2008); BriteSmile, Inc. v. Discus Dental Inc., No. C 023220 JSW (JL), 2004 WL 2271589, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004); Rayman v. Am. Charter
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 148 F.R.D. 647, 654 (D. Neb. 1993); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch
& Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 309 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also Nidec v. Victor Co. of Japan,
249 F.R.D. 575, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (recognizing such zones exist).
112. See, e.g., La. Mun. Police, 253 F.R.D. at 309-10; Dura, 2008 WL 2217682, at *23; BriteSmile, 2004 WL 2271589, at *1; Tenneco Packaging Specialty & Consumer Prods.,
Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., No. 98-C-2679, 1999 WL 754748, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14,
1999); Rayman, 148 F.R.D. at 654-55; Hewlett-Packard, 115 F.R.D. at 309.
113. See Morvil, 2012 WL 760603, at *3; Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Roxane
Labs., Inc., No. 2:05-cv-0889, 2007 WL 895059, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2007); Nidec, 249
F.R.D. at 579-80; BriteSmile, 2004 WL 2271589, at *1; Tenneco, 1999 WL 754748, at *2;
Rayman, 148 F.R.D. at 654-55; Hewlett-Packard, 115 F.R.D. at 309. See generally Pavento,
Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76 (analyzing privilege in intellectual property due
diligence).
114. Dura, 2008 WL 2217682, at *3.
115. Id.
116. La. Mun. Police, 253 F.R.D. at 310 (holding that "the fact that the parties were on
adverse sides of a business deal . . does not compel the conclusion that the parties did not
share a common legal interest" when they are contemplating mutual future litigation).
117. See Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 551-52 (discussing cases). Again, this
distinction may be less stark in the work product posture. See EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at
1038-46.
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commercial appraisal does not suffice."' By this logic, the oft-cited"19
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. could find sharing of patent
analysis protected because it was "'quite likely' that both parties would be
sued by the plaintiff and that the defendant would defend the marketing of
the product in the years preceding the sale to the third party while the third
party would defend the same product for the years following the sale."1 20 By
contrast, Nidec found the sharing of patent analysis sub judice only "to
further a commercial transaction in which the parties, if anything, have
opposing interests."121 Nidec, as had other cases before it,1 22 rejected a broad
reading of Hewlett-Packard to suggest that "common interest privilege
extends generally to disclosures made in connection with the prospective
purchase of a business" absent some nexus to a common legal matter. 123
Whether Hewlett-Packard actually goes so far is debatable on its
language, though some commentators have read it so. 124 Indeed, one went so
far as to propose a presumption in favor of common interest during
transactional due diligence, based in part on Hewlett-Packard'spurportedly
lax standard.1 25 The best policy, nonetheless, seems to be in following Nidec
to reconcile the various decisions on due diligence privilege under a single
principle.1 26 Other scholars have proposed similar rationales for common
interest where the parties are transferring assets like trade secrets or
technology subject to litigation because "[t]he seller's interest in defending
those rights with respect to pre-sale production or occurrences is virtually
identical to the buyer's position with respect to post-sale production and
occurrences."1 27
There are disadvantages to Nidec's attempt at harmonization, however.
Deciding whether legal material is shared in due diligence for commercial

&

118. Nidec v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249 F.R.D. 575, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also
Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 73-74 (emphasizing distinction).
119. See Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76, at 362.
120. Nidec, 249 F.R.D. at 579 (describing and quoting Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch
Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 310 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
121. Id. at 580.
122. E.g., Oak Indus. v. Zenith Indus., 1988 WL 79614, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(discussing, distinguishing, and rejecting Hewlett-Packard).
123. Nidec, 249 F.R.D. at 579.
124. See, e.g., King, supra note 8, at 1428-30 (detailing the "Hewlett-Packard
approach"); Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 551-52 (same).
125. See King, supra note 8, at 1440-42.
126. Nidec, 249 F.R.D. at 578-80; see Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 551-52, 552
n.40 (discussing Nidec and attempting to harmonize the Hewlett-Packard standard); Pavento,
Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76, at 362-63 (harmonizing Nidec and Hewlett-Packard).
127. Hundley, supra note 32, at 110; see Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 552 (noting
the importance of documenting prospectively the "joint litigation interest").
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valuation or to assess joint defense of a claim is likely to be an exercise in
hair-splitting,1 28 and context will matter critically. 129 For example, even a
disclosure regarding threatened litigation did not enjoy common interest
privilege because its motivation was found "purely financial," as evidenced
by its provision to investment bankers.1 30 Such ad-hockery creates business
dilemmas as well: poised between Hewlett-Packard'sapparently permissive
stance on privilege and the cases rejecting it, "corporate buyers and sellers
are placed in the precarious situation of having to choose between a potential
waiver of privilege and a potential lost business opportunity."131 Diligence
counsel should thus take note of how they couch requests and pursue
discussions with their counterparts to maximize the arguments for privilege,
at least so long as the courts remain arguably split on the question.1 32
C. Negotiation and Execution of a Merger Agreement
Whether prior to, simultaneously with, or following due diligence, the
parties to a potential merger or acquisition must also negotiate the terms of
the agreement itself.1 33 Such negotiations are transparently done in a stance
of adversity: each side is attempting to gain the greatest advantage for its
shareholders and other stakeholders.1 34 As a court in the Northern District of

128. See King, supra note 8, at 1430-42 (criticizing case-by-case judgments on privilege
as lacking in predictability).
129. See Crace, Latham & Yetter, supra note 10 ("Determinations of whether a 'common
interest' is adequately 'legal' or adequately 'shared' by the parties are often highly
contextual."); see EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 293 ("As beauty is in the eye of the beholder, so
too this legal as opposed to business interests is in the eye of this particular magistrate
judge."); see also e.g., Nidec, 249 F.R.D. at 579-80; Oak Indus. v. Zenith Indus., 1988 WL
79614, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (no privilege for shared patent opinions because process and
interest were fundamentally commercial).
130. Blanchard v. Edgemark Fin. Corp., 192 F.R.D. 233, 237 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
131. Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 551-52.
132. See id.; see also Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76, at 354
(advocating care in due diligence given differential results).
133. Anne King argues persuasively that regardless of the timing of due diligence vis-Avis negotiations, the former evinces a higher degree of commitment and intimacy between the
parties, which ought to bolster the arguments for privilege. See King, supra note 8. This is
reflected in the cases, where common interest is fairly often upheld in circumscribed zones in
due diligence, but only with great rarity in negotiations. Compare supra Section II.B, with
infra Section III.C.
134. See Blau v. Harrison (In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig.), No. 06 C 4674,
2007 WL 2363311, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007); Nidec v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249 F.R.D.
575, 579 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76, at 365 ("As a
starting point, it is prudent to assume that disclosure of privileged information to a third party
will result in a privilege waiver . . . . This guiding principle is particularly true in the context of
any arms-length negotiation.").
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Illinois explained: "Prior to the merger, these organizations stood on
opposite sides of a business transaction. From a business standpoint and
from a legal standpoint, the merger parties' interests stood opposed to each
other. They had no common interest, and indeed, their interests were in
conflict."' 35 Although merger agreements are hardly a zero-sum game,
generally what is conceded by one party accrues in some degree to the
benefit of the other.' 3 6 With scant exception, therefore, courts have held that
the parties' lawyers' discussions of terms and negotiation of the deal itself
cannot be subject to common interest privilege 3 7: "of the cases addressing a
party's disclosure of confidential information during negotiations, almost all
have held that such disclosure waives the privilege. These cases have held
that whatever the common interest shared by parties at the negotiating table,
it is insufficient."

138

This will remain so even after a merger agreement is executed, because
the "common interest rule is concerned with the relationship between the
transferor and the transferee at the time that the confidential information is

135. Blau, 2007 WL 2363311, at *5; accordNidec, 249 F.R.D. at 580.
136. See Blau, 2007 WL 2363311, at *5; Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note
76, at 360 ("The court reasoned that prior to the merger, the organizations stood on opposite
sides of the business transaction, and their interests were in conflict because if one gained a
better deal, the other suffered.") (describing the court's reasoning in Blau).
137. See King, supra note 8, at 1412-13, 1413 n.8 ("Most courts conclude that
disclosures made during transaction negotiations work a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, and thus courts decline to allow common interest protection."); id. at 1426-27;
Olson, Varallo & Koch, supra note 70, at 904-05; Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra
note 76, at 365 (noting "natural assumption that the parties' interests are adverse when a
corporate transaction is being negotiated"); e.g., Blau, 2007 WL 2363311, at *5; Oak Indus. v.
Zenith Indus., 1988 WL 79614, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 1988); 3Com Corp. v. Diamond II Holdings,
Inc., No. 3933-VCN, 2010 WL 2280734, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2010) ("The two
companies, however, had adverse interests both in negotiating the Side Letter and in
determining, if necessary, responsibility for the Merger Agreement's termination."); see also
Nidec v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249 F.R.D. 575, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (clarifying no
common interest in negotiation of commercial terms); Zirn v. VLI Corp., No. 9488, 1990 WL
119865, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993);
Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., No. 8077, 1986 WL 3426, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 1986)
("I cannot conclude that communications between its attorneys and attorneys for MGM Grand
with respect to the negotiation and documentation of the proposed merger possessed the
requisite confidentiality in these circumstances. With respect to the functions they were
performing when the documents sought were prepared, these lawyers obviously represented
clients with adverse interests.").
138. Oak Indus., 1988 WL 79614, at *4 (citing Res. Inst. for Med. & Chemistry v. Wis.
Alumni Res. Found., 114 F.R.D. 672, 676-77 (W.D. Wis. 1987)); see also Union Carbide Co.
v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1050 (D. Del. 1985); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70
F.R.D. 508, 512-13 (D. Conn. 1976).
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disclosed."1 39 The parties to an executed merger agreement may well then
have a powerful interest in preventing outsiders seeking to question or
challenge the deal from gaining insight into their lawyers' quondam views of
pain points and troublesome issues attendant to the transaction; if the merger
parties are sued, this interest may be even greater. 140 But the accretive
timeline of privilege runs only one way, and the merger parties' newfound
synchrony cannot retroactively draw the veil of privilege over their previous
adversarial negotiations.141 As a result, lawyers engaging in deal
negotiations must be mindful of how any unguarded or "colorful" comments
at the time may affect the ultimate success of the merger if divulged.1 42
There may nonetheless be narrow exceptions-far narrower than the
recurrent exceptions seen in due diligence-for elements of a merger
agreement of identical import to both parties even at the time.1 43 At least a
few courts have suggested common interest might apply to parties'
assessments of the antitrust and regulatory prospects of the potential
combination in negotiations, reasoning they shared a common legal interest
in prospectively structuring a deal that will satisfy the regulatory scrutiny to
which both parties will be subject.144 Such an allowance, if it exists at all,

139. In re United Mine Workers of Am. Emp. Benefit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 314
(D.D.C. 1994); accord Kingsway Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Pricewaterhouse-Coopers LLP, 2008 WL
5423316, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2008).
140. See, e.g., Jedwab, 1986 WL 3426, at *2.
141. See id. ("The fact that both Bally and MGM Grand are defendants in this lawsuit
does not render documents relating to the negotiation of the transaction itself confidential. If
there is no basis for a finding of confidentiality, there is no basis for the lawyer-client
privilege."); see also Cohen v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., No. CL 81833, 2002 WL 34217931,
at *3 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 2002) (conceding merger negotiations not privileged despite
later lawsuit). Contra King, supra note 8, at 1431 ("In addition, hindsight bias might influence
courts in the common interest inquiry. That is, if litigation emerges, and the parties formerly
involved in business negotiations are aligned, a court may be more likely to find that the
parties shared a common interest at the time of disclosure.").
142. See Olson, Varallo & Koch, supra note 70, at 901-02.
143. See In re Leslie Controls, 437 B.R. 493, 501-02 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) ("The
Insurers argue, in effect, for establishment of a per se rule that parties engaged in negotiations
can never share a common interest. While there are cases that support this argument, they are
not universal. For example, the Third Circuit has held that parties engaged in merger
negotiations may share a common interest. This Court believes that the imposition of a
blackline rule is inappropriate. Rather, commonality must be measured on a case by case
basis.") (citing In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007)). The
bankruptcy court's reading of In re Teleglobe is probably too blithe, depending on a generic
comment that common interest privilege can arise even in a transactional context. Id.
144. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 512-13 (D. Conn. 1976)
(suggesting that whilst antitrust consideration in "negotiating the price for relinquishing voting
and managerial control" is not subject to common interest, an "interest in the negotiations [as]
that of a potential co-defendant in a possible antitrust action" would be); 3Com Corp. v.
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would likely be limited to this unique joint regulatory concern, for as a rule,
"common interest doctrine does not extend to communications about a joint
business or financial transaction, merely because the parties share an interest
in seeing the transaction is legally appropriate." 4 5 Both sides undoubtedly
want to craft a viable and enforceable agreement, but they differ in wanting
one that advantages them over their counterpart to the extent the law
allows. 146
On rare occasion, courts have viewed the interval between a letter of
intent or similar instrument 47 and the definitive agreement as subject to
greater privilege protection, reasoning that "[d]ocuments exchanged by
parties who have already committed in writing to negotiate a more detailed
formal agreement are protected under the 'common interest' theory, as
reasonably necessary to further the interests of both parties in finalizing
negotiations."1 48 Judges confronting such postures may well demand
heightened showings or review in camera to ensure the privilege is narrowly

Diamond II Holdings, Inc., No. 3933-VCN, 2010 WL 2280734, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2010) (observing that the parties had a common interest in obtaining regulatory approval even
whilst they were adverse as to negotiation of a side letter and termination clauses, and
reviewing in camera to separate the former from the latter).
145. FSP Stallion 1, LLC v. Luce, No. 08-cv-01 155, 2010 WL 3895914, at *21 (D. Nev.
Sept. 30, 2010) ("Additionally, the common interest doctrine does not apply simply because
the parties are interested in developing a business deal that complies with the law, and a
common goal to avoid litigation. A desire to comply with applicable laws and to avoid
litigation does not transform their common interest and enterprise into a legal, as opposed to a
commercial, matter.").
146. See SCM Corp., 70 F.R.D. at 513 (stating that interest in complying with antitrust
laws does not outweigh the differing interests of parties to a negotiation).
147. Cf Harvey L. Temkin, When Does the "Fat Lady" Sing?: An Analysis of
"Agreements in Principle" in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 132-33
(1986) (determining when such instruments may be found binding on the parties).
148. OXY Res. Cal. LLC v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 631-32 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (quoting a trial court and noting that "the preacquisition documents are dated between
the time OXY and EOG signed a letter of intent and the time they finalized the negotiations
and entered into formal contracts"); see also STI Outdoor LLC v. Superior Court, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 865, 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ("Here, the declarations and papers submitted by the
MTA and STI establish that Items C and R were documents prepared by counsel, which were
circulated between two parties bound by an offer and acceptance in contemplation of a
binding, detailed License Agreement .... The evidence supports the contention that the
disclosure of such documents was reasonably necessary to further the interests of both parties
in finalizing negotiations for the License Agreement. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
finding that the attorney-client privilege was waived."). See generally Richmond, supra note
57, at 423-27 (discussing Oxy Resources at length and calling it a "very practical decision").
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constrained, if they are even willing to entertain the notion. 4 9 Others have
been yet more skeptical, finding that the period between early versions of a
merger agreement and the final is insusceptible to common interest
privilege.' In the mine run of cases, companies sharing information at any
stage of contractual negotiations are seeking to further the commercial and at
least semi-adversarial goal of a final agreement, not to co-litigate an
underlying legal issue.'"' The bargaining table makes a Procrustean bed for
common interests: proponents may try to wedge their negotiations into the
rubric, but courts are apt to reject such contortions. 152
D.

ObtainingRegulatoryApproval Pursuantto a MergerAgreement

If the delicate dance of due diligence and contentious contract
negotiations analogize to the dating history between the future corporate
spouses, then execution of the merger agreement is the marriage proposal.
Before the agreement, the parties are flirting with a potential union;
afterwards, they have definitively agreed to pursue that goal, generally right
down to setting an outside date for the consummation (subject to customary
closing conditions and regulatory approvals, of course). 5 3 A signed merger

149. See OXYRes., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 638-39 (reversing denial of a motion to compel for
documents insufficiently defended in privilege log); id. at 640 (finding in camera review
necessary for the remainder).
150. See, e.g., Zirn v. VLI Corp., No. 9488, 1990 WL 119685, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13,
1990), rev'd on other grounds, 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993) (finding no common interest during
a period between an initial merger agreement and the revision of that agreement).
151. See Nidec Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 249 F.R.D. 575, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
(discussing cases).
152. As the OXY Resources court observed:
Here, by contrast, the Joint Defense Agreement also purports to protect
communications made during the course of the transaction that gives rise to this
lawsuit. According to Calpine, this type of agreement "amounts to a premeditated
and intentional plan to shield conspiratorial communications involving a transaction
that directly and adversely affected Calpine's contractual rights." We agree there is
a potential for abuse when parties rely on common interest agreements to protect
prelawsuit communications that may be highly relevant to issues presented in a
lawsuit.
OXY Res., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 638. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 293 ("Like Cinderella's
stepsisters, this judge is shoe horning the facts of this case into the requisite legal category of
legal as opposed to mere business interests.").
153. E.g., SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 690 (D.D.C. 1978)
(citing the merger agreement) ("[T]he transactions contemplated herein shall have been
consummated on or before November 28, 1969."); see Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147 (Del. 1989); Richard Steuer, Jodi Simala & John Roberti,
Competition Law in Merger Transactions:Managing and Allocating Risk in the New Normal,
9 COMPETITION L. INT'L 31, 43 (2013).
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agreement thus represents a turning point in the relationship between parties
seeking to combine for purposes of privilege. 5 4 The Illinois court cited ante
that rejected privilege prior to an agreement went on to hold that:
After the parties to the merger signed the merger agreement, they
shared a common interest in ensuring that the newly agreed merger
met any regulatory conditions and achieved shareholder approval.
Both parties had reached an agreement on the terms of the deal, and
both parties at that point shared the goal of ensuring that the merger
was approved.'
Viewing the merger agreement as the watershed for common interest
privilege is also the prevailing approach of courts that have confronted the
question. 5 6 One observed that the "weight of the case law suggests that, as a
general matter, privileged information disclosed during a merger between

154. E.g., cases cited infra note 156; see Crace, Latham & Yetter, supra note 10
("[P]arties should probably assume-to be safe that any communications made prior to the
signing of a merger agreement . . will not be covered by the attorney-client privilege as
extended by the common-interest doctrine. Parties should also delay as long as practicable the
exchange of any sensitive legal materials, preferably until after the merger agreement has been
signed and there is a reasonable certainty of the transaction closing."); Pavento, Marti,
Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76, at 365. See generally Steuer, Simala & Roberti, supra note
153, at 35-45 (discussing various provisions found in merger agreements specifying allocation
of antitrust litigation risk).
155. Blau v. Harrison (In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig.), No. 06 C 4674, 2007
WL 2363311, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007).
156. E.g., id; United States v. Gulf Oil Co., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1985) ("Cities did not waive the work product privilege attached to these documents by
disclosing the documents to Gulf pursuant to the merger agreement. Gulf and Cities were
obviously not adversaries at the time of the disclosure. To the contrary, they were in the initial
stages of becoming parent and subsidiary."); Cohen v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., No. CL
81833, 2002 WL 34217931, at *6-7 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 2002) ("The Purchaser and
Director Defendants' common interest began with the execution of the merger agreement.
From this point forward, . . . they had a common interest-legal
strategies for seeking
regulatory approval and discussions relating to the joint defense of this lawsuit in
effectuating the merger agreement .... communications prepared in reference to regulatory
approval after the merger agreement was executed are protected. . . ."); Zirn v. VLI Corp., No.
9488, 1990 WL 119685, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990), rev'don other grounds, 621 A.2d 773
(Del. 1993) (finding that the parties "still had adverse interests, at least until the revised merger
agreement was executed on November 3, 1987, and therefore documents generated between
August 30, 1987 and November 3, 1987 could not be of common interest to them"); see also
Ambac Assur. Co. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 44 (N.Y. 2016) (Rivera,
J., dissenting) ("[W]here parties to a merger agreement have a common legal interest in the
successful completion of the merger, the privilege should apply to communications exchanged
to comply with legal and regulatory requirements related to consummation of the merger.").
But see In re Leslie Controls Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 501-02, 501 n.32 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010).
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two unaffiliated businesses would fall within the common-interest
doctrine." 5 7 After all, with the agreement finalized, the parties now face
together the mutual legal challenges of shareholder votes and regulatory
filings, review, and approval.' Cooperation in these matters is often
required by the merger agreement itself, giving force to the joint legal
undertaking.15 9
For larger transactions, these regulatory challenges are not trivial and
necessitate the active involvement of both companies' counsel.1 60 Many
courts would find such cooperation privileged absent extraordinary
circumstances.16' For example, in Cohen v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., the
merger parties conceded that the negotiation of their merger agreement was
discoverable, but argued that "communications prepared in reference to
regulatory approval after the merger agreement was executed are protected,
including preliminary drafts of documents later versions of which were
submitted to regulatory agencies," 162 in their case the Iowa Utilities Board
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.1 63 The court agreed, finding that
the parties "were beyond negotiating the agreement and the communications
were made in confidence. A common interest existed in effectuating the
agreement."1 64 Such holdings ensure counsel in complex transactions can
navigate the regulatory hurdles efficiently.1 65

157. Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 53, 62 (D. Mass. 2001) (n.b., a number
of the cases cited were in a pre-agreement posture); see also Gelman v. W2 Ltd., No. 14-6548,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14787, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 2016) (noting common interest has
been successfully asserted outside litigation in the merger context).
158. See, e.g., 3Com Corp. v. Diamond II Holdings, Inc., No. 3933-VCN, 2010 WL
2280734, at *7-8 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2010) ("Newco and Huawei appear to have had a
common interest in obtaining CFIUS approval and seeing the merger to its completion.");
supra note 156.
159. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 312.
160. See Naughton, supra note 8, at 66 (discussing necessity of information sharing and
strategic coordination); Steuer, Simala & Roberti, supra note 153, at 44.
161. See, e.g., Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 295-96 (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel.
Co. (AT&T), 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); 3Com, 2010 WL 2280734, at *8; Blau v.
Harrison (In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig.), No. 06 C 4674, 2007 WL 2363311, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007); Cohen, 2002 WL 34217931, at *7.
162. Cohen, 2002 WL 34217931, at *7.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 335
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev'd, 57 N.E.3d 30 (N.Y. 2016); Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 45 (Rivera, J.,
dissenting); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D. Cal.
1987); see also Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Noonan Transp., No. 970325, 2000 WL 33171004
(Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 2000) ("At a time and in an age where transactions and the
litigation they produce are increasingly complex, I am of the opinion that the joint defense or
common interest components of the attorney-client privilege are necessary to ensure, as a
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Contemporaneously with seeking regulatory approval, merging
companies usually engage in extensive or plenary sharing of business
records-including legal matters 66-in an effort to acquaint themselves
with the other's business to best frame their arguments and prepare for the
day they are combined as one.1 67 To this end, merger agreements often
require such information sharing.1 68 Courts have held that such exchanges
are protected by common interest privilege no less than regulatory strategy
itself.1 69 In so holding, the court of appeals reasoned in United States v. Gulf
Oil Co. that the merger parties "were obviously not adversaries at the time of
the disclosure. To the contrary, they were in the initial stages of becoming
parent and subsidiary. Consequently, [one] had a legitimate, nonadversarial,
interest in reviewing [the other's] attorneys' work product . . . ."170
Information sharing after the merger agreement is thus in a quite different
posture than that conducted in due diligence beforehand. '7'
Not all jurisdictions are in accord. The most prominent nonconformist,
New York, has long applied a strict form of common interest privilege
requiring that the parties be aligned in litigation, not merely navigating

practical matter, that clients receive the fully informed advice the attorney-client privilege is
designed to produce. Individuals or entities with joint or common interests simply cannot
obtain such advice if their attorneys must proceed in splendid isolation and are prohibited from
interacting with others for the purpose of determining whether and to what extent common
measures for preservation of common interests are available, feasible and agreeable to all who
may have such interests."); cf Sunshine, supra note 18, at 852, 869-70 (arguing such regimes
are necessary for sound legal advice in the modern regulatory landscape).
166. See In re Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 707-08 (5th Cir. 2001).
167. See, e.g., Naughton, supra note 8, at 66; United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d
292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritius)
Holdings Pvt. Ltd., No. 8980-VCG, 2013 WL 5787958, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 25, 2013).
168. See, e.g., Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 293 ("Under the terms of the agreement each
company was permitted full access to the business records of the other."); Cooper Tire, 2013
WL 5787958, at *4 & n.24.
169. E.g., Blau v. Harrison (In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig.), No. 06 C 4674,
2007 WL 2363311, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007); Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 296.
170. Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 296.
171. Compare sources cited supra note 154, infra notes 172-175 and accompanying text,
with supra Section III.A. But cf Naughton, supra note 8, at 69 ("Finally, the extent of
information exchange that is allowable pre-signing during the due diligence process may be
greater than that allowed in connection with post-signing integration planning. This point is
often surprising to the merging parties, who believe anything that is in the due diligence data
room should be available as the starting point for integration planning because the parties have
by then shown a greater commitment to carrying out the transaction by signing the agreement.
Viewed through the lens of a Section I rule of reason analysis, however, the assessment is
different.").
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regulatory hurdles.1 72 In 2014, an appellate panel in the First Department
made a gesture to harmonizing New York law with that of most other states
and federal jurisdictions, explaining persuasively why documents shared
between lawyers for merging companies seeking regulatory approval should
retain privilege:
We find, however, that this line of cases does not adequately
address the specific situation presented here: two business entities,
having signed a merger agreement without contemplating litigation,
and having signed a confidentiality agreement, required the shared
advice of counsel in order to accurately navigate the complex legal
and regulatory process involved in completing the transaction. As
BAC aptly asserts, imposing a litigation requirement in this scenario
discourages parties with a shared legal interest, such as the signed
merger agreement here, from seeking and sharing that advice, and
would inevitably result instead in the onset of regulatory or private
litigation because of the parties' lack of sound guidance from
counsel. This outcome would make poor legal as well as poor
business policy. 173

A divided court of appeals, however, quashed the foray towards reform
and reconfirmed New York's idiosyncratic approach and litigation
requirement, alluding to concerns about abuse of the privilege and the fact
that companies had not been dissuaded from merging in New York by the
stricter doctrine.1 74 The appellate panel was reversed, and the parties shared

172. See, e.g., Allied Irish Banks, P.L.C. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 252 F.R.D 163, 171
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's
London, 676 N.Y.S.2d 727, 732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998)) ("New York [limits common interest]
'to communications with respect to legal advice in pending or reasonably anticipated
litigation. .. .'); Ambac Assur. Co. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.Y.S.3d 30, 36
(N.Y. 2016) (citing Hyatt v. State of Cal. Franchise Tax Bd., 962 N.Y.S.2d 282 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013)); Hudson Val. Mar., Inc. v. Town of Cortlandt, 816 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2006); Yemini v. Goldberg, 821 N.Y.S.2d 384, 386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (quoting People
v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183 (N.Y. 1989)); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's London, 676 N.Y.S.2d 727, 733 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998). But see, e.g., Cavallaro v.
United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 53, 62 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding in the merger context that "the
'interest' required by the common-interest doctrine need not be construed so narrowly as to
exclude communications involving a common legal interest even where no litigation is on the
horizon").
173. Ambac, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 335 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev'd, 57 N.E.3d 30 (N.Y.
2016).
174. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38.
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documents ordered produced. 7' Counsel for companies merging under New
York choice of law can expect little solicitude for shared privilege outside
litigation and must therefore consider carefully what they discuss with their
counterparts.1 76 Similarly perilous legal regimes can be found in a minority
of states and, as discussed earlier, the Fifth Circuit. 177 Even in states without
strict litigation requirements, the application of common interest absent a
nexus to some litigation interest cannot be wholly assured. 17' Nonetheless,
as another court of appeals summarized, the "weight of authority favors our
conclusion that litigation need not be actual or imminent for
communications to be within the common interest doctrine."1 79
E.

Litigation in Defense of the Transaction

To the dismay of many businesspersons (though key to the livelihood of
many attorneys), it is rare that any proposed transaction of substantial size
does not occasion at least the risk of litigation."so Whether the potentially

175. Id. at 40.
176. See, e.g., Daniel J. Buzzetta, Merger Partners:Beware ofEffect ofAmbac Ruling on
Privilege, N.Y.L.J. (July 11, 2016), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/120
2762164404/?slreturn=20171006125947.
177. The New York Court of Appeals could cite eleven states (Arkansas, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Texas, and Vermont) with statutes saddling the common interest privilege with a litigation
requirement, and five states (New Jersey, Tennessee, Maryland, Virginia, and Florida) that had
imposed the same judicially. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 36-37, 36 n.2, 37 n.3.
178. See, e.g., Integrated Glob. Concepts, Inc. v. j2 Glob., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-03434-RMW
(PSG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7294, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (finding common
interest inapplicable between parties to a signed merger agreement for lack of impending
litigation).
179. United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 n.6 (7th Cir. 2007); accord
Crace, Latham & Yetter, supra note 10 ("There is a large body of federal case law from
various jurisdictions in which courts have applied the common-interest doctrine to
communications exchanged between parties to a pending merger transaction. Most courts
apply the common-interest doctrine somewhat broadly, consistent with the Delaware position
that there does not need to be pending litigation involving both parties in order for a 'common
interest' to exist.").
180. See Olson, Varallo & Koch, supra note 70, at 901 ("When parties execute a merger
agreement involving a public company, there is a good chance of attracting litigation.");
Griffith & Lahav, supra note 16, at 1063 & n.41 (citing Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff
Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L.
REv. 101, 112 (2014)). See generally M. Sean Royall & Adam J. Di Vincenzo, When Mergers
Become a Private Matter: An Updated Antitrust Primer, ANTITRUST, Spring 2012, at 41
("Private merger actions filed on behalf of consumers . . have become increasingly common
in the past several years."); Steuer, Simala & Roberti, supra note 153 (examining increased
governmental enforcement and regulation of mergers).
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aggrieved parties are customers, business affiliates, shareholders, state
regulators, or antitrust boffins at the Department of Justice, Federal Trade
Commission, or a foreign competition agency, there are simply too many
interested and watchful eyes for major mergers to pass untouched."' Whilst
navigating such hurdles without undue delay is the laudable goal, some
transactions will inevitably fall short, and litigation will ensue seeking to
block or rescind the merger. 8 2 (In the vocabulary of interpersonal relations,
litigation is perhaps best analogized to objections to the newly-announced
fianc6 lodged by family and friends.)
Even parsimonious jurisdictions like New York and the Fifth Circuit
would concede that parties to a merger would share a common interest in
litigation, and accordingly may share privileged communications. 8 3 A
fortiori, the more permissive majority view litigation as ipso facto a zone of
common interest. 184 Indeed, once the specter or reality of a lawsuit appears,
the impending or actual codefendants may avail themselves of the older joint
defense privilege rather than the more recent common interest privilege
necessary in the pre-litigation stance." As discussed earlier, since the

181. See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(government antitrust suit); FTC v. Heinz, 246 F.3d 708, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (government
antitrust suit); United States v. Oracle, Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2004)
(government antitrust suit); Cohen v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., No. CL 81833, 2002 WL
34217931, at *1 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 2002) (shareholder derivative suit); California v.
Sutter Health Sys., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (state-initiated suit seeking
preliminary merger injunction); Zirn v. VLI Corp., No. 9488, 1990 WL 119685, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 13, 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993) (minority shareholder
rescissory suit); Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., No. 8077, 1986 WL 3426, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 20, 1986) (same); see generally Griffith & Lahav, supra note 16 (discussing private
antitrust cases generally); Royall & Di Vincenzo, supra note 180 (same).
182. See sources cited supra note 181.
183. See In re Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 2001) ("According to our
circuit precedents, the two types of communications protected under the [common legal
interest] privilege are: (1) communications between co-defendants in actual litigation and their
counsel; and (2) communications between potential co-defendants and their counsel.")
(citations omitted); Ambac Assur. Co. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 37
(N.Y. 2016) ("Disclosure is privileged between codefendants, coplaintiffs or persons who
reasonably anticipate that they will become colitigants . . . .").
184. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d
244, 249 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming "common interest in litigation"); United States v. Am. Tel.
& Tel. Co. (AT&T), 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (same).
185. In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Under Seal, 415 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing
United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The joint defense
privilege, an extension of the attorney-client privilege, protects communications between
parties who share a common interest in litigation."); see, e.g., John Morrell & Co. v. Local
Union 304A of the United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 555-56 (8th Cir.
1990); In re GrandJury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, 902 F.2d at 248; Wilson P. Abraham
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seminal Chahoon v. Commonwealth in 1871, codefendants have been
entitled to coordinate their defenses subject to privilege as of right. 186 (Of
course, it is cold comfort to codefendants that they may now cooperate more
fully with their bedfellows. 187) Merger agreements often obligate the parties
to defend the proposed transaction in the event of litigation, setting forth the
commonality expressly.8 8
So well established is shared privilege as between codefendants that few
courts have had cause to review it squarely in the merger context, for lack of
any challenges. 8 9 Those confronting such challenges have upheld the
application of joint defense or common interest, though often in
idiosyncratic or tangential postures.' 90 In FTC v. Exxon, for example, the
FTC had challenged Exxon's transaction with Reliance but was denied a

Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The defendants
persuasively argue that in a joint defense of a conspiracy charge, the counsel of each defendant
is, in effect, the counsel of all for the purposes of invoking the attorney-client privilege in
order to shield mutually shared confidences. We agree . . . ."); Cont'l Oil Co. v. United States,
330 F.2d 347, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1964); see also Sunshine, supra note 18, at 841-48
(distinguishing theory underlying joint defense and common interest privileges).
186. See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 822, 841-42 (1871); supra notes
41-47 and accompanying text.
187. Cf Buzzetta, supra note 176 ("Threatened or actual litigation may not be desirable,
but it is now essential for litigants invoking the common interest doctrine in New York.").
188. E.g., ABA Antitrust Section Committees, Litigation Commitments, AM. BAR Ass'N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/antitrustlaw/committees/mergerscontractprovisions_d
atabase/mergerstopic/litigation commitments.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2017); see Steuer,
Simala & Roberti, supra note 153, at 42.
189. See Trs. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Tr. Fund v. Tr. Fund Advisors, Inc.,
266 F.R.D. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2010) ("There is no clearer example of when the privilege is
protected than in this case, where the transferor and transferee are engaged in related litigation
against a common adversary on the same issue or issues."); EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 301 ("It
is obvious that the privilege applies when parties are already engaged in litigation or a joint
venture where their legal interests coincide."); cf Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court, 256 Cal.
Rptr. 425, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("The author of the most recent law review article on the
subject of 'allied party exchange of information' notes the paucity of precedent. What little
law there is, is federal. The issue of waiver in the federal courts turns on a determination of
whether there is commonality of interest among the parties as to whom disclosure occurred.
Most of the cases involve either joint defense of criminal cases, albeit by separate counsel, or
related prosecutions of antitrust or similar lawsuits by plaintiffs with interests in common. In
those factual contexts, the federal courts do not treat joint disclosure as waiver.") (citations
omitted).
190. See FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("We agree that
Exxon, Reliance, and the Drives Group share a common interest in obtaining approval of the
acquisition [in litigation]."); Cohen v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., No. CL 81833, 2002 WL
34217931, at *9 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 2002) ("[D]ocuments prepared by counsel relating to
the filing and defense of this lawsuit are protected."); Ambac Assur. Co. v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 37 (N.Y. 2016).
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preliminary injunction.' 9' Instead, Exxon was ordered to maintain separately
a particular business unit at issue to facilitate potential divestiture, 192 and
Exxon and Reliance closed the deal.1 93 At trial on the FTC's claims, the
district court ordered that the business unit obtain its own counsel because it
had both common and distinct interests;1 94 Exxon, its new owner,
appealed.1 95 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the
parties to the merger had a common legal interest in vindicating the
transaction in the instant lawsuit, but that the business unit also had a distinct
commercial interest in ensuring its viability, were it to be divested, an
interest Exxon did not share.1 96
A bit more ticklish is the situation where only one of the merging parties
is targeted by a lawsuit, as in a derivative or direct action by aggrieved
shareholders. 19 Although the merging parties are not then technically
codefendants, favorable resolution of an action assailing the merger from
any quarter is manifestly in the common legal interest of all parties
attempting to combine.1 98 (Indeed, given that shareholder suits often
continue after a merger closes for lack of a preliminary injunction, the allies
may soon enough be united in form as well as interest.199) Such logic has
persuaded courts generally to uphold common interest for like-minded
corporations even when only one of them is actually a party to litigation. 200

191. Exxon, 636 F.2d at 1337-38, 1339.
192. Id. at 1339.
193. Id
194. Id. at 1341 (quoting FTC v. Exxon Corp., No. 79-1975, 1980 WL 1879, at *2
(D.D.C. June 25, 1980)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1345-46, 1347; see also infra Section IV.A (discussing how coexistence of
common and non-common interests does not foreclose privilege).
197. See, e.g., In re Schmitz, 285 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex. 2009); In re Syncor Int'l Corp.
S'holders Litig., 857 A.2d 994, 997 (Del. Ch. 2004); Marcoux v. Prim, No. 04-cvs-920, 2004
WL 830393, at *12 (N.C. Super. Apr. 16, 2004); Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc.,
845 A.2d 1031, 1034 (Del. 2004).
198. See Griffith & Lahav, supra note 16, at 1064 ("All of these demands put significant
pressure on the transaction. A deal that is enjoined, even temporarily, may fall apart. Extensive
discovery will likely slow down the deal, adding cost and increasing the risk of
nonconsummation. In order to minimize contingent liabilities and be assured of a legally valid
transaction, both parties to the merger typically insist that such litigation be concluded before
the transaction can close.").
199. See In re Schmitz, 285 S.W.3d at 452-53; Zirn v. VLI Corp., No. 9488, 1990 WL
119685, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 621 A.2d 773 (Del. 1993);
Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., No. 8077, 1986 WL 3426, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 1986).
200. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244,
249 (4th Cir. 1990); Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 687-88 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (citing
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1172 (D.S.C. 1974)) ("The third
party corporation need not be a party to any anticipated or pending litigation; it may share a
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By like reasoning, parties allied in antitrust litigation positions, but not
technically co-litigants, can share information to advance their suits within
the protection of common interest. In United States v. AT&T, the D.C.
Circuit held that privilege was not waived in work product shared between
the government and MCI, both of whom were pursuing antitrust claims
against AT&T in separate cases. 201 Under AT&Ts logic, "what is sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander," 202 and antitrust defendants should be able
to enjoy such no less ambit than plaintiffs. 203
The question does arise-critically in jurisdictions imposing a litigation
requirement upon common interest-of when litigation is sufficiently likely
to implicate the right to privilege. 204 Courts give the standard variously as
"reasonably anticipated," 205 "foreseeable," or "imminent." 206 What is clear
in the merger context is that a generic assertion that "highly
regulated .

.

. institutions constantly face a threat of litigation and that the

protection of their shared communications is necessary" 207 will not suffice; a
more particularized showing is necessary. 208 Intuitively, the imminence that
forms the dividing line between mere common interest and litigationdependent joint defense privilege should be informed by the availability of

.

#

community of interest (so as to keep communications privileged) if it shares an identical, and
not merely similar, legal interest as the client with respect to the subject matter of the
communication between the client and its attorney. The court finds that Carrier and Hamilton
do share an identical legal interest: defense of a claim based upon a malfunction of valve
242. While Hamilton is not a party to the Texas lawsuit, and thus technically is not defending a
claim against it, it nevertheless has a significant interest in the outcome of Roberts' case . .
(footnote and citation omitted); see Fischer, supra note 17, at 640-42.
201. United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. (AT&T), 642 F.2d 1285, 1301 (D.C. Cir.
1980); see also Schachar v. Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 187, 192 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (like posture).
202. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH IDIOMS 152 (John Ayto ed., Oxford Univ. Press,

3d ed. 2009).
203. See AT&T, 642 F.2d at 1299 ("But 'common interests' should not be construed as
narrowly limited to co-parties. So long as transferor and transferee anticipate litigation against
a common adversary on the same issue or issues, they have strong common interests in sharing
the fruit of the trial preparation efforts."); see also Trs. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension
Tr. Fund v. Tr. Fund Advisors, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 2010) ("There is no clearer
example of when the privilege is protected than in this case, where the transferor and
transferee are engaged in related litigation against a common adversary on the same issue or
issues.").
204. See, e.g., Schomig, supra note 72, at 5.
205. Ambac Assur. Co. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 39 (N.Y.
2016).
206. In re Santa Fe Int'l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 714 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting the district
court's opinion).
207. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38.
208. See id.
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work product privilege. 209 The latter, after all, applies only to documents
prepared "because of' litigation, which should satisfy any formulation of a
litigation requirement. 210 The wisdom of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
is then informative:
[A]sked by a client to evaluate the antitrust implications of a
proposed merger and advised that no specific claim had yet
surfaced, a lawyer knowing that work product is unprotected would
not likely risk preparing an internal legal memorandum assessing
the merger's weaknesses, jotting down on a yellow legal pad
possible areas of vulnerability, or sending a note to a partner"After reviewing the proposed merger, I think it's O.K., although
I'm a little worried about ... What are your views?" Nor would the
partner respond in writing, "I disagree. This merger is vulnerable
because . . . " Discouraging lawyers from engaging in the writing,

note-taking, and communications so critical to effective legal
thinking would, in Hickman's words, "demoraliz[e]" the legal
profession, and "the interests of the clients and the cause of justice
would be poorly served."

21

1

Such reasoning in the work product context suggests that counsel to
merger parties coordinating their antitrust strategy in light of opposition
from regulatory authorities or other adversaries may well be able to argue
that litigation is foreseeable, and thus a joint defense privilege applies, even
212
in the strictest jurisdictions.
F. Consummation
The long path to the altar ends with the vows, or in corporate marriages,
with consummation of the transaction. 213 Once the merger or acquisition

209. See Schomig, supra note 72, at 5; Sunshine, supra note 18, at 857-58 ("Common
interest in the work product context is inherently and unobjectionably tethered to the lawsuit
that animates the work product privilege itself.").
210. See United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 136-37 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(collecting cases applying "because of' standard); Sunshine, supra note 18, at 855-56.
211. In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 886-87 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947)) (second alteration and ellipses in original).
212. See id.
213. Traditionally, of course, marriage calls for consummation in either case. See
generally J. Edward Hudson, Marital Consummation According to Ecclesiastical Legislation
(1977) (J.C.D. dissertation, Saint Paul University of Ottawa), https://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/
handle/ 10393/21828. But see Franklin G. Fessenden, Nullity of Marriage, 13 HARv. L. REV.
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closes, the two former independent operators are unified under the same
corporate ownership. 214 In the case of many mergers, the two companies
cease to have independent existence, and the assets and personnel of one are
absorbed into the other; the taxonomy of the various structural vehicles for
the absorption is ultimately irrelevant to the assessment of privilege. 215 What
matters, is that there is no longer any way to formally distinguish the two,
and thus, the corporate attomey-client privilege fully covers all persons and
affairs formerly within the wheelhouse of distinct companies. 216 As the
Supreme Court announced in CFTC v. Weintraub, in acquiring a company
lock, stock, and barrel, the new ownership also obtains the full measure of
any privilege interests the target company held:
[W]hen control of a corporation passes to new management, the
authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client
privilege passes as well. New managers installed as a result of a
takeover, merger, loss of confidence by shareholders, or simply
normal succession, may waive the attomey-client privilege with
respect to communications made by former officers and directors.
Displaced managers may not assert the privilege over the wishes of
current managers, even as to statements that the former might have
made to counsel concerning matters within the scope of their
corporate duties. 217

110, 121 (1899) ("Non-consummation is not a ground for dissolution of marriage. Consensus,
non concubitus,facit matrimonium.").

214. See generally Mandavi Jayakar & Aditya Parolia, TriangularMergers, How to View
Them, 3 BOCCONI LEGAL PAPERS 77 (2014) (discussing merger structures); see also Martin
Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1106-11 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 68
A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012) (discussing various forms of merger in light of an NDA and JDA).
215. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 259(a) ("When any merger or consolidation
shall have become effective under this chapter, for all purposes of the laws of this State the
separate existence of all the constituent corporations, or of all such constituent corporations
except the one into which the other or others of such constituent corporations have been
merged, as the case may be, shall cease and the constituent corporations shall become a new
corporation, or be merged into 1 of such corporations, as the case may be, possessing all the
rights, privileges, powers and franchises as well of a public as of a private nature, and being
subject to all the restrictions, disabilities and duties of each of such corporations so merged or
consolidated.").
216. See id.; Hundley, supra note 32, at 91 ("After a statutory merger or consolidation,
the new or surviving corporation controls the privileges of its predecessors.").
217. CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985); see also Great Hill Equity Partners
IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLP, 80 A.3d 155, 162 (Del. Ch. 2013) (interpreting the
term "privileges" in § 259 to include all evidentiary privileges); Girl Scouts of W. Okla., Inc.,
v. Barringer-Thompson, 252 P.3d 844, 848 (Okla. 2011).
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Though Weintraub seemingly dictates that all of the absorbed
company's secrets now belong to its acquirer, some lower courts have split
on the awkward potential for the acquisition target's internal legal advice
anent the transaction itself being bought as well.2 18 The New York Court of
Appeals, for example, carved out a judicial exception for the target
company's legal analysis of the merger, reasoning (consistent with its
meager view of common interest between merger partners 219) that the rights
to such privilege analysis should not be imputed to the new but formerly
adversarial owner. 220 Delaware, in Great Hill Equity PartnersIV, LP v. SIG
Growth Equity Fund I, LLP, though likewise concerned about awkward
revelations, predictably adopted a view more deferential to contract,
observing that the merger agreement might exclude such documents from
the purchase. 22' Although the parties in GreatHill had not done so, chancery
has respected the reservations of those that did bargain for such carveouts. 222 Most courts, however, have followed Weintraub without cavil in
averring that where an entire company has transferred to new ownership, so
too go all the prerogatives of privilege. 223
In some transactions, the parties do not relinquish their independent
corporate identities, as when the acquirer maintains the acquisition target as
a wholly-owned subsidiary. 224 Where the parties remain discrete under a
unified ownership structure, courts have adopted multiple approaches in
analyzing issues of privilege. 225 Some have viewed the parent company and

218. Compare cases cited infra notes 220-222.
219. See supra notes 172-177 and accompanying text.
220. TekniPlex Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 89 N.Y.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. 1996).
221. Great Hill, 80 A.3d at 160-61; see also Postorivo v. AG Paintball Holdings, Inc.,
No. 299 1-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 17, at *29 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2008).
222. Postorivo, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 17.
223. See, e.g., UStarcom, Inc. v. Starent Networks Corp., No. 07 C 2582, 2009 WL
4908579, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2009); Am. Intern. Specialty Lines, Inc. v. NWI-I Corp., 240
F.R.D. 401 (N.D. Ill. 2007); Coffin v. Bowater Inc., No. CIV-03-227-PC, 2005 WL 5885367,
at *2 (D. Me. 2005); Soverain Software LLV v. Gap, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 760, 763 (E.D. Tex.
2004); Girl Scouts of W. Okla., Inc., v. Barringer-Thompson, 252 P.3d 844, 848-49 (Okla.
2011); Novack v. Raytheon Co., No. SUCV201302852BLS1, 2014 WL 7506205, at *2 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2014) (acquirer gained premerger discussion with counsel regarding the
acquisition).
224. E.g., Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 841, 843
(N.D. Ill. 1988).
225. In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 369-70 (3d Cir. 2007) ("Because
parent companies often centralize the provision of legal services to the entire corporate group
in one in-house legal department, it is important to consider how the disclosure rule affects the
sharing of information among corporate affiliates. Recognizing that any other result would
wreak havoc on corporate counsel offices, courts almost universally hold that intra-group
information sharing does not implicate the disclosure rule. This result is unquestionably
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its subsidiary as being almost wholly aligned in common interest, such that
privilege can be shared in the mine run of business operations without fear
of waiver. 226 This approach has the benefit of allowing for some small
subset of disputes that may render the two overtly adversarial and thus
abrogate privilege. 227 On rare occasion, a judge has gone further, insisting
that affiliates under the same corporate umbrella carry an affirmative burden
to show they shared a common legal interest, reasoning that the corporate
family is free to organize itself as it chooses, but must accept the
consequences should it operate as multiple legal entities. 228
Such meticulousness, however, is the exception rather than the rule.
Most courts more practically view subsidiaries like any other subdivision of
a unitary entity, an appendage of the ultimate corporate owner. 229 One factor
notable in protecting privilege is that the same counsel represent the multiple

&

correct. The cases, however, vary in how they reach the result."); Hundley, supra note 32, at
78-80; see also cases cited infra notes 226-229.
226. See, e.g., In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d 345, 369-79 (3d Cir. 2007); Cary Oil Co., Inc.
v. MG Ref. Mktg., Inc., No. 99 Civ. 1725VMDFE, 2000 WL 1800750, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2000); Music Sales Corp. v. Morris, No. 98CIV.9002(SAS)(FM), 1999 WL 974025, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1999); Glidden Co. v. Jandernoa, 173 F.R.D. 459, 472-73 (W.D. Mich.
1997); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1185 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd,
540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976).
227. See, e.g., Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 32 (N.D. Ill.
1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 39394 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Fogel v. Zell (In re Madison Mgmt. Grp.), 212 B.R. 894, 896 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1997) (parent and subsidiary); Yorke v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. (In re Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co.), 121 B.R. 794, 796-97 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990). See generally infra Part V
(discussing privilege in suits between parties to failed mergers).
228. E.g., Gulf Islands Leasing v. Bombardier Capital, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 466, 473-74
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("The mere existence of an affiliate relationship does not excuse a party from
demonstrating the applicability of the common interest rule. Having chosen to operate as
separate entities and to obtain whatever advantages inure from so operating Bombardier
Capital and Bombardier Aerospace must be held to their burden of proving the applicability of
any privilege in the same manner as two unrelated entities. That burden has not been met in
this case.") (internal citations omitted); see also In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 371-72
("[A]bsent some compelling reason to disregard entity separateness, in the typical case courts
should treat the various members of the corporate group as the separate corporations they are
and not as one client.").
229. See, e.g., In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 369-72; Crabb v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., No.
91-5474, 1992 WL 1321, at *3 (6th Cir. 1992) ("It is well settled that attorney-client privilege
is not waived merely because the communications involved extend across corporate structures
to encompass parent corporations, subsidiary corporations, and affiliated corporations.");
Glidden v. Jandernoa, 173 F.R.D. 459, 472 (W.D. Mich. 1997); United States v. Am. Tel.
Tel. Co., 86 F.R.D. 603, 616 (D.D.C. 1979) ("The cases clearly hold that a corporate 'client'
includes not only the corporation by whom the attorney is employed or retained, but also
parent, subsidiary and affiliate corporations."); see also cases cited supra note 226 (applying
common interest absent searching inquiry).
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companies in the corporate family; judges evaluating privilege are more
likely to look askance if the ostensibly aligned companies feel the need to
retain separate outside counsel, suggesting potential divergence in the
entities' interests.

230

At most companies, ordinary course-of-business legal

work by lawyers for both parent and child, comingling the affairs of both,
militates in favor of a shared privilege. 231 At any rate, much more could be
written on confidentiality amongst co-owned companies, but others have
done so, and such discursion would stray from this Article's focus on the
pathway to corporate marriage rather than post-closing realities.2 32
Before leaving discussion of the accretive timeline, however, a final
note should be made on the Weintraub transfer of privilege to the acquiring
company. 233 One commentator, John T. Hundley, has suggested that
[i]f a voluntary, commercially motivated sale does not result in
waiver of the privilege-and to the contrary, cases hold that such
privileges, as a matter of law, become shared with the new parent
upon consummation of such a transaction then sharing of those
confidences preparatory to the closing should not be waiver
either.234
Although there is some practical logic to the notion, an acquirer
preemptively sharing fully in the privilege of its acquisition target prior to
consummation surely sweeps too broadly and raises too many difficult
questions. (When and how would such a right attach? If such a preemptive

230. See In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 379; Bowne v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 491
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Gulf Islands, 215 F.R.D. at 474 ("While cases have upheld assertions of the
common interest rule for related companies, 'they have done so only upon a showing that a
common attorney was representing both corporate entities or that the two corporations shared a
common legal interest.' Thus, the proponent of the privilege must still prove a common legal
interest and may not rely solely on the fact that the entities at issue are affiliated with each
other. Some cases state the broad proposition that disclosure of attorney-client privileged
information to an affiliated company does not waive the privilege-thereby obviating the need
to invoke the common interest rule. But it appears that in such cases no waiver was found
because the entities were represented by a common attorney or shared a common legal interest.
In this case, however, Bombardier Capital and Bombardier Aerospace utilized different
attorneys and held different interests of a commercial, not legal, nature.") (quoting Bowne)
(citations omitted); see also Yorke, 121 B.R. at 796-97 (viewing parent-child companies as a
sort of joint representation); Polycast Tech. Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 47, 49
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same).
231. See In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 375-79; Yorke, 121 B.R. at 796-97; Polycast, 125
F.R.D. at 49; see also Fogel, 214 B.R. at 896-97 (discussing and approving Yorke).
232. See generally In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d 345; Hundley, supra note 32.
233. See supra notes 216-223 and accompanying text.
234. Hundley, supra note 32, at 93.
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sharing of privilege were to be recognized based on the inevitability of the
privilege accruing to the purchaser, what then of transactions that fail to
close? Could the preemptively shared privilege be retroactively voided?
Would the sharing thereupon constitute waiver?) Nonetheless, Hundley's
audacious proposal underscores the reality that the relationship of companies
in courtship is an intimate one indeed.
IV.

DOMESTIC QUARRELS: DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN MERGER PARTIES

But the road to true love seldom runs smooth, even for companies
that make paving materials.235
As foreshadowed by the roll of cases analyzing regulatory scrutiny and
legal challenges, the path to corporate marriage is not without obstacles.
Although such vicissitudes usually come from without, 236 it is not
uncommon that the parties to a merger find themselves in unfriendly
postures in certain regards during the protracted process of reaching the
closing. 23 7 This is hardly unexpected prior to the signing of a merger
agreement, where there are few areas of common interest: the parties remain
broadly adversarial, and thus lack the general safeguard of a shared
privilege. 238 Subsequent to the agreement, however, the posture is reversed:
parties can expect to collaborate on regulatory filings and submissions,
strategy for obtaining approvals, advocacy in favor of the transaction,
planning for integration activities in the event of a consummation, and the
defense of any legal challenges.239 What then of companies who,
notwithstanding their overarching community of interests, find themselves in
dispute during the course of obtaining regulatory approval or litigation? Like
planning a wedding, the pressures of shepherding a merger to completion
can try the patience and amicability of even the most close-knit couple. 240
Such internecine squabbles are no less common between corporate fianc6es
than individuals.241

235. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1092 (Del.
Ch.), aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012).
236. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 293-94 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1985).
237. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d at 293-94.
238. See supra Section III.A.

239. Id.
240. See Africa, supra note 2, at 52; cf Humble, Zvonkovich & Walker, supra note 24.
241. Cf Africa, supra note 2, at 54 ("If all this attention to the subjective side of merger
evaluation makes you nervous, consider this analogy: merger/marriage - the sharing of assets,
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DistinguishingCommon from Non-Common Interests

Fundamentally, one must differentiate whether quarrels are ultimately
under the umbrella of the common interest, or relate to a different matter
where there is no such commonality. 242 Given lawyerly nature, 243 any two
parties will have differences of approach as to the best way to pursue their
common interest in effectuating a merger transaction. 244 Clearly, it cannot be
the rule that any trivial disagreement undermines a jointly-held privilege. As
early as 1923, courts had found "that the privilege of one joint client cannot
be destroyed at the behest of the other where the two have merely had a
'falling out' in the sense of ill-feeling or divergence of interests." 245 Indeed,
much of the benefit of common interest privilege derives from allowing the
parties ambit to speak frankly and freely about their views of legal strategy;
to hold that cross words jeopardize the privilege would thus render it
nugatory. 246 The touchstone is whether the two parties are cooperating in
service of an ultimate legal goal, not whether they proceed amicably in each
and every particular. 247 A Massachusetts court explained:

debts, reputation and a mutual future. A merger search that merely considers economics is not
enough."); id. at 52, 57; e.g., cases cited infra note 244.
242. See EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 307 ("When clients have adverse as well as common
interests, the question of whether a particular communication is privileged depends on whether
it relates to the common or the adverse interests.").

243. Cf Chris Buller & William Taylor, PartnershipsBetween Public And Private: The
Experience of the Cooperative Research Center for Plant Science In Australia, 2
AGBLoFoRUM 17, 22 (1999) ("The old saying 'take two lawyers and expect three opinions'

was proven again."); John Molnar, Consent in the '90s, 16 MED. & L. 567, 568 (1997) ("You
will have heard the old adage that if there are two lawyers in a room, there is bound to be three
opinions.").

244. See, e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 295-96 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1985); 3Com Corp. v. Diamond II Holdings, Inc., No. 3933-VCN, 2010 WL 2280734, at
*3 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2010).
245. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381,
394 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (citing State v. Archuleta, 29 N.M. 25, 217 P. 619 (N. Mex. 1923)); see
EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 317 ("In order for the parties to have 'fallen out,' there must be
adversary litigation between them. It is not sufficient that there be only ill feelings or
divergence of interest.").
246. See Steuer, Simala & Roberti, supra note 153, at 44 ("The joint defence agreement
provides the parties with comfort that they may have frank discussions and share privileged
materials to develop a clearance strategy and provide candid assessments."); Hundley, supra
note 32, at 85 n.99; Fischer, supra note 17, at 637-39; e.g., United States v. BDO Seidman,

LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d
Cir. 1989); United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting
joint defense agreement calling for "open and candid exchange" between the parties).

247. See Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 283 n.1 (4th Cir.
2010) (observing that common interest privilege "must leave room for the parties to debate the
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It is highly unlikely that any common or joint defense, at least in
matters of some complexity, can proceed without some adjustment
of differing interests. Indeed, joint consultations are likely to deal
quite often with methods for adjusting those differing interests
while maintaining a common front against the common opponent. If
a joint defense or common interest privilege is to have any practical
effect, therefore, it must survive exchanges in which the parties
discuss and adjust those differing interests. 248

By way of further illustration, in United States v. United Technologies
Corp., 249 a consortium of aerospace companies had shared legal advice
regarding the structuring of their venture to minimize tax liability. 250 In a not
unpredictable action by the Internal Revenue Service over that liability, 25 1

the government sought disclosure on grounds that there could be no common
interest privilege amongst the competing parties. 252 The district court
disagreed, citing SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp. 253:
In formulating this strategy, the members acted not as adversaries
negotiating at arms' length but as collaborators, legally committed
to a cooperative venture and seeking to make that venture
maximally profitable. The process revealed in the documents was

means by which they will secure their common end"); SEC, Inc. v. Wyly, No. 10 Civ. 5760,

2011 WL 3851129, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2011) (holding that "parties do not need to be in
exact lock-step of interest in order for the common-interest doctrine to apply"); In re

Rivastigmine Patent Litig., No. 05-MD-1661, 2005 WL 2319005, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,
2005); United States v. United Techs. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108, 112 (D. Conn. 1997); Am.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Noonan Transp., No. 970325, 2000 WL 33171004 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Nov. 16, 2000); see also United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129, 139-40 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
("[T]he possibility of a future dispute between Deloitte and Dow does not render Deloitte a
potential adversary for the present purpose. If it did, any voluntary disclosure would constitute
waiver [of work product] . . . . Here, the question is not whether Deloitte could be Dow's
adversary in any conceivable future litigation, but whether Deloitte could be Dow's adversary
in the sort of litigation the Dow Documents address."); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595,
604-05 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("The Court finds little merit in the class' contention that the joint
defense privilege does not extend to civil defendants whose liability may arise from different
acts or omissions, or who may assert cross-claims against each other. Even should such allies
later become estranged, they would arguably still be entitled jointly to invoke the attorneyclient privilege to protect shared confidences from disclosure at the behest of a third party.").

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Am. Auto. Ins., 2000 WL 33171004, *8.
United States v. United Techs. Corp., 979 F. Supp. 108 (D. Conn. 1997).
Id. at 110.
Id.
Id.
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn. 1976).
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not without hostility, but it appears to have been closer to the "joint
analysis and cooperative study" of Xerox's patent committee than to
the price negotiation of the Rank-Xerox transaction. 25 4
The pursuit of a common legal interest may thus involve some measure
of "hostility" in service of that mutual goal. 255
Nor could there be any requirement that parties be aligned in every
regard to enjoy privilege. 25 6 Common interests regularly and
unobjectionably coexist with even adverse interests; privilege then applies
only to the former. 257 Indeed, "several courts have determined that even
parties with significant conflicts of interest may maintain a privilege as to
information shared concerning a common legal interest." 258 This allowance
is most often identified in the joint defense context, 25 9 where codefendants
have a clear common interest in exoneration even as each also has an
adverse interest in saving itself at the expense of the other. 260 Even if an
inter partes lawsuit is anticipated at some later date, the parties may still

254. United Techs., 979 F. Supp. at 111 (quoting SCM Corp., 70 F.R.D. at 518).
255. Id.; see cases cited supra note 247; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 317.
256. Such alignment is realistically impossible: no two companies will ever be onehundred-percent aligned prior to consummation of a combination, and perhaps not even then.
See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th Cir. 1979) ("Ingram argues that the
co-defendants' defenses must be in all respects compatible if the joint-defense privilege is to
be applicable. The cases do not establish such a limitation, and there is no reason to impose
it .... The Advisory Committee's Note to proposed Rule 503(b) makes it clear that the jointinterest privilege is not limited to situations in which the positions of the parties are compatible
in all respects."); Hundley, supra note 32, at 85 n.99; see also supra Section III.F.
257. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787-88 (3d Cir. 1985) ("We agree
with the district court's ruling that the correspondence was privileged, since it is best viewed
as part of an ongoing and joint effort to set up a common defense strategy between a defendant
and an attorney who was responsible for coordinating a common defense position.
Communications to an attorney to establish a common defense strategy are privileged even
though the attorney represents another client with some adverse interests.") (citing McPartlin,
595 F.2d at 1336-37; Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183, 184-85 (9th Cir. 1965); Cont'l
Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1964)).
258. Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 71 & nn.81-83 (citing United States v. Bay State
Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1989)); see also United States
v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1981); Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., PLC, 508
So. 2d 437, 441-42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
259. See Bartel, supra note 39, at 876-77.
260. See id.; see also Hunydee, 355 F.2d at 184-85 (criminal codefendants considering
implicating the other); McPartlin, 595 F.2d at 1336-37 ("The privilege protects pooling of
information for any defense purpose common to the participating defendants. Cooperation
between defendants in such circumstances is often not only in their own best interests but
serves to expedite the trial or, as in the case at bar, the trial preparation."); Eisenberg, 766 F.2d
at 787-88 (mutual correspondence regarding investor disclosure and trial strategy).
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propone privilege on the matter of current common interest.261 (Of course, in
the event a lawsuit does transpire, such a risky undertaking of privilege may
not survive.262)
Taking concurrent common and non-common interests to their logical
limit, in Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.,263 the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals confronted a law firm that had purported to
represent two parties (CTI and Eureka) against a common foe whilst also
covertly representing Eureka in claims against CTI arising from the same set
of transactions.

264

Setting aside the dubious ethical stance of the law firm,

265

the court held that CTI could not discover the attorney-client
communications between its Janus-faced ally and attorneys, because that
representation was clearly distinct from the joint representation that Eureka
and CTI shared. 266 Eureka intended that its clandestine inter partes
campaign be concealed from CTI, notwithstanding their privileged
cooperation as co-clients, and thus its own attorney-client communications
were to be protected. 267 Even in such extremity, common and adverse
268
interests can coexist.

This is manifestly so in the merger context, as there is no reason to
expect merger parties will cease to have divergent interests in their

261. See In re Leslie Controls, Inc., 437 B.R. 493, 497 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) ("The
privilege applies where the interests of the parties are not identical, and it applies even where
the parties' interests are adverse in substantial respects. The privilege applies even where a
lawsuit is foreseeable in the future between the co-defendants."); GUS Consulting GMBH v.
Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 20 Misc.3d 539, 541-42 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2008) ("The privilege
applies when a limited common purpose necessitates disclosure to certain parties. Thus, even
where a later lawsuit is foreseeable between the co-defendants[,] that does not prevent them
from sharing confidential information for the purpose of a common interest.")
262. See Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., PLC, 508 So. 2d 437, 441-42 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987); see generally infra Part V.
263. Eureka Inv. Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 743 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam).
264. Id. at 935-37.
265. Id. at 937-38 ("We need not express any view on CTI's contention that Fried, Frank
should not have simultaneously undertaken to represent Eureka in an interest adverse to CTI
and continued to represent CTI in a closely related matter. As Wigmore's second principle
expressly states, counsel's failure to avoid a conflict of interest should not deprive the client of
the privilege. The privilege, being the client's, should not be defeated solely because the
attorney's conduct was ethically questionable.").
266. Id. at 938.
267. Id. at 936-37.
268. A similar result obtained in Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., PLC, 508 So. 2d
437, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), where common interest in a distinct matter was upheld
between a plaintiff and defendant opposed in ongoing litigation. See infra notes 362-366 and
accompanying text.
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commercial dealings.2 69 Indeed, during the pendency of the merger, the
parties must continue to compete as independent operators, lest they be
accused of so-called gun-jumping under the antitrust laws. 270 A pending
merger no more affords a common privilege to unrelated business activities
than it allows the parties to collaborate in such activities in violation of
antitrust law.271 Accordingly, the transactional common interest reaches only
as far as the community of the parties' interests in effectuating the
agreement to merge. 272 Interactions between parties to a merger in the
ordinary course of their business will receive whatever protection than they
would or would not (generally the latter) absent the impending union. 273
Nonetheless, it is vital to note that "[r]ecognizing that the privilege must
be flexible enough to survive discussion of differing interests, however, is a
far cry from saying that it survives .

.

. differences so deep and profound that

litigation is the likely outcome." 274 Analogy may be found in McNally
Tunneling Corp. v. City of Evanston, where a sewer contractor sued for
recompense from Evanston, which had reached a settlement with the
engineer it hired to oversee the project. 275 The contractor sought discovery

of an agreement between Evanston and the engineer, claiming it was a
settlement agreement reflecting arms-length negotiations; Evanston
maintained it was a privileged joint defense agreement. 276 The court
Solomonically deemed it both and held the settlement portion discoverable
whilst the joint defense portion was privileged 277:

269. See, e.g., Naughton, supra note 8.
270. See, e.g., United States v. Gemstar-TV Guide Int'l Inc., No. 03-00198, 2003 WL
21799949, at *2 (D.D.C. July 11, 2003); United States v. Comput. Assocs. Int'l Inc., No. 0102062, 2002 WL 31961456, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2002); see generally Naughton, supra note
8.
271. Cf Naughton, supra note 8, at 76 ("Collaborations or coordinated market activities
that are suspect outside of the merger context will also likely warrant scrutiny when
undertaken by merging parties.").
272. See, e.g., Blau v. Harrison (In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig.), No. 06 C
4674, 2007 WL 2363311, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007); Cohen v. Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.,
No. CL 81833, 2002 WL 34217931, at *6-7 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 2002).
273. To be sure, even independent operators may on occasion enjoy privilege when they
collaborate in a common legal endeavor. See supra Section III.A.
274. Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Noonan Transp., No. 970325, 2000 WL 33171004, at *8
(Mass. Super. Nov. 16, 2000).
275. McNally Tunneling Corp. v. City of Evanston, No. 00-C-6979, 2001 WL 1246630,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2001).
276. Id. at *1-2.
277. Id. at *3-4.
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The common interest doctrine does not apply if those parties have
an incentive to blame each other for alleged wrongful conduct. In
this case, however, because Evanston and Harza resolved their
adverse interests in the settlement agreement, they do not have an
incentive to blame each other for the alleged breach of contract.
Accordingly, this Court concludes that Evanston and Harza have a
common interest in defending McNally's suit, an interest that is
reflected in the joint defense agreement.278
Such language might imply that common interests cannot coexist with
express allegations regarding the same matter, which has some intuitive
appeal. A few other cases have echoed McNally's analysis, albeit also
outside the context of a merger. 279 In any event, once accusations are in the
air, lawsuits often follow.
all bets are off.281

B.

280

When quarrels evolve into outright litigation,

The Rule Against UnilateralWaiver

In the course of quarrels, both large and small, it may come to pass that
one of the parties wishes to disclose information subject to common interest
privilege for some strategic reason. 28 2 Or, for that matter, one party could
inadvertently disclose shared privileged material under the burdens of
extensive discovery, or through simple carelessness. 28 3 As a general rule, a
client's purposefully divulging privileged material to an adversarial third

278. Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
279. E.g., Lislewood Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Corp., No. 13-CV-1418, 2015 WL
1539051, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2015) (quoting McNally in an action for breach of a
commercial lease) ("[T]he common-interest doctrine is inapplicable if parties have an
incentive to 'blame each other' for alleged wrongful conduct."); Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Nebula
Glasslam Int'l Inc., No. 07-22326-CIV, 2008 WL 756455, at *5-7, *7 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11,
2008) (discussing McNally at length and following it in upholding common interest in part,
finding that "McNally's holding rests on the lynchpin that Evanston and Harza no longer had
an incentive to blame each other for the alleged breach of contract for which they entered into
the settlement agreement"); see also AMEC Civ., LLC v. DMJM Harris, Inc., No. 06-064
(FLW), 2008 WL 8171059, at *3 (D.N.J. July 11, 2008) (applying McNally and failing to find
common interest privilege in part).
280. Cf., e.g., Jeld- Wen, 2008 WL 756455; McNally, 2001 WL 1246630.
281. See infra Part V.
282. See, e.g., Fogel v. Zell (In re Madison Mgmt. Grp.), 212 B.R. 894, 895-96 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1997).
283. See, e.g., Julie Cohen, Look Before You Leap: A Guide to the Law of Inadvertent
Disclosure of Privileged Information in the Era of E-Discovery, 93 IOWA L. REv. 627, 646
(2008).
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party forever waives the privilege.28 4 Even inadvertent disclosure can effect
waiver absent diligent efforts to avoid error. 285 Indeed, the common interest
rule essentially operates as an exception that prevents waiver when
disclosure is made to an ally. 286 But the common interest privilege itself then
raises a new question: under what circumstances can one party to the
common interest waive the privilege for all sharing in it? 287 The Restatement
helpfully provides a concise answer:
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, any member [of the
community of interest] may waive the privilege with respect to that
person's own communications. Correlatively, a member is not
authorized to waive the privilege for another member's
communication. If a document or other recording embodies
communications from two or more members, a waiver is effective
only if concurred in by all members whose communications are
involved, unless an objecting member's communication can be
redacted.

288

At least in this summary, the Restatement reflects case law faithfully. 28 9
The circuits and cases are in accord that one party cannot unilaterally waive
any privilege held by another that was shared pursuant to a common
interest. 290 The requirement for unanimity reflects courts' concerns that if

284. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1888); United States v. Collis, 128
F.3d 313, 320 (6th Cir. 1997).
285. See FED. R. EVID. 502(b); see also, e.g., Amobi v. D.C. Dep't of Corr., 262 F.R.D.
45, 51 (D.D.C. 2009); see Cohen, supra note 283, at 633-41 (discussing varying approaches
prior to the 2008 revision to the Federal Rules of Evidence).
286. See generally Bartel, supra note 39, at 890-91, 912-13; Cynthia B. Feagan, Issue of
Waiver in Multi-Party Litigation: The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product

Doctrine, 61 UMKC L. REV. 757, 757-58 (1993); J. Randolph Evans & Shari L. Klevens,
Joint Defense vs. Common Interest Agreements, LAW.COM: DAILY REPORT (Sept. 30, 2015),

https://www.law.com/dailyreportonline/almID/1202737728156/?slreturn=20171010081908.
287. Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 69 ("Any jurisdiction striving to effectively apply the
common interest doctrine, however, must definitively answer the following questions: . . . (5)
To whom does the power to waive the common interest doctrine belong?").
288. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
289. Cf Sunshine, supra note 18, at 838-39, 839 n.40 (noting uncertain reliability of the
Restatement).

290. E.g., United States v. Gonzales, 669 F.3d 974, 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2012); United
States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 817 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that "the privileged
status of communications falling within the common interest doctrine cannot be waived
without the consent of all the parties . . . ."); In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345,

364 (3d Cir. 2007); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Newparent), 274 F.3d 563, 572-73 (1st Cir.
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one party could waive the privilege of all, common interest arrangements
would become highly hazardous, if they even continued to exist at all; even
close allies would be reluctant to share key confidences if they thereby
surrendered any ability to protect themselves in the future.2 9' Such cases
have adverted pointedly to the possibility that a faithless party might seek to
trade its allies' secrets for its own exoneration. 292 Or, for that matter, after
the parties' alliance had reached an end, one might seek to market the
other's confidences for personal or pecuniary gain. 293 The rule against
unilateral waiver deftly prevents such abuses and thus preserves the viability
of common interest arrangements.

294

&

2001); In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1994); John Morrell & Co. v. Local
Union 304A of the United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 544, 556 (8th Cir. 1990); In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129, 902 F.2d 244, 248 (4th Cir.
1990); Abbett Mun. Income Fund, Inc. v. Asami, No. C-12-03694 DMR, 2013 WL 5609333,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013); United States v. Balsiger, No. 07-CR-57, 2011 WL
10879630, at *9 (E.D. Wis. May 11, 2011); W. Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 102
F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo. 1984); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 29
(N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp.
381, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Fogel v. Zell (In re Madison Mgmt. Grp.), 212 B.R. 894, 898
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); Yorke v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. (In re Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.), 121
B.R. 794, 796-97 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); see also Bartel, supra note 39, at 893 ("Most courts
hold that the consent of all members is necessary for a valid waiver to occur."); Drumright
Griffin, supra note 41, at 45. But see Hundley, supra note 32, at 108-09 (arguing that
unilateral waiver is permissible in common interest privilege but not joint defense privilege).
291. See Bartel, supra note 39, at 877 (discussing such issues and proposing solutions);
Drumright & Griffin, supra note 41, at 45; Fischer, supra note 17, at 661; see, e.g., Gonzalez,
669 F.3d at 978; W Fuels, 102 F.R.D. at 203 ("This limitation is necessary to assure joint
defense efforts are not inhibited or even precluded by the fear that a party to joint defense
communications may subsequently unilaterally waive the privileges of all participants, either
purposefully in an effort to exonerate himself, or inadvert[e]ntly."); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394 ("Indeed, to allow such disclosure would so further erode the
privilege's protection as to reduce joint defense to an improbable alternative. How well could a
joint defense proceed in the light of each co-defendant's knowledge that any one of the others
might trade resultant disclosures to third parties as the price of his own exoneration or for the
satisfaction of a personal animus? The attorney-client privilege, carved out to ensure free
disclosure between client and counsel, should not thus be whittled away."); In re Wagar, No.
1:06-MC-127, 2006 WL 3699544, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2006) ("[T]he essential benefit
of such joint collaboration is that a member of the common legal enterprise cannot reveal the
contents of the shared communications without consent of all the parties . . .the privilege
continues long after a member of the agreement has departed from the legal consortium and
none of the parties to the agreement may unilaterally waive the privilege.").
292. See W. Fuels, 102 F.R.D. at 203; In re GrandJury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394.
293. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394; In re Wagar, 2006 WL
3699544, at *12.
294. See In re GrandJury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394.
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By contrast, there is no such reason to prevent a party from divulging
and thus waiving its own privilege; indeed, public policy militates in favor
of control over one's own secrets. 295 Most courts have found a party is free
to do so. 2 96 Some have found such waivers render the disclosed information
freely admissible against all the allied parties. 297 More courts, however,
along with the Restatement, would hold that the other common interest
parties should not be penalized: "Any member of a common-interest
arrangement may invoke the privilege against third persons, even if the
communication in question was not originally made by or addressed to the
objecting member." 298 One commentator pondered rhetorically of such
situations, "once one [party] has waived a joint privilege by disclosing the
privileged communications, what does there remain to protect?" 299 But that
very commentary answered its own question, as have cases addressing such
discrepant waivers: a court can enter a protective order preventing the use of
the waived material against allies who did not concur.300
Regardless of the effect on allies, it would be odd indeed were a
company to relinquish its right to disclose its own secrets elsewhere because
it had already revealed the secret to an ally. If anything, a few courts have
been over-deferential to privilege in this context, proposing just such an

295. In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d at 719 (quoting Wigmore for the principle that "[w]here
the consultation was held by several clients jointly, the waiver should be joint for joint
statements, and neither could waive for the disclosure of the other's statements; yet neither
should be able to obstruct the other in the disclosure of the latter's own statements"); Balsiger,
2011 WL 10879630, at *9; see Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 83.
296. See, e.g., Balsiger, 2011 WL 10879630, at *9; In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 364; In
re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d at 719; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 922
(8th Cir. 1997) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 126(1)
(AM. LAW INST. 2000)); Abbett Mun. Income Fund, Inc. v. Asami, No. C-12-03694 DMR,
2013 WL 5609333, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013); Cargill Inc. v. Budine, No. CV-F-07349-LJO-SMS, 2008 WL 2856642, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 21, 2008); United States v. Agnello,
135 F. Supp. 2d 380, 383 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 16 F. App'x 57 (2d Cir. 2001).
297. E.g., Agnello, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 383.
298. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) cmt. g (AM.
LAW INST. 2000); Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 83-84 ("Courts treat the unauthorized waiver of
the privilege by one member of a common interest group as a waiver as to that party only. The
non-waiving members of the group retain the privilege."); Drumright & Griffin, supra note 41,
at 45; e.g., Abbett, 2013 WL 5609333, at *5; Cargill, 2008 WL 2856642, at *4.
299. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 323.
300. E.g., Abbett, 2013 WL 5609333, at *5; Cargill, 2008 WL 2856642, at *4 ("The line
of cases which hold that waiver by one party to the joint privilege does not constitute a waiver
for any other . . . can only be so as to privileges that have not been shared, since if one party to
the joint privilege discloses the privileged communications, the cat is out of the bag.
Nonetheless a protective order could be entered precluding use of the privileged
communications against any but the disclosing party.") (quoting EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at
323-24).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss2/3

50

Sunshine: The Secrets of Corporate Courtship and Marriage: Evaluating Commo
2017]

351

COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE IN MERGERS

oddity: that one party to common interest cannot even waive its own
privilege in a document that is shared with the other party, under the rule
against unilateral waiver.3 01 Such solicitude likely goes too far and has been
expressly rejected by some courts in favor of the Restatement's approach.3 02
That approach neatly protects the parties to common interest jointly whilst
declining to handcuff allies' control over their own secrets, deferring to both
public policy concerns.303 Nevertheless, the prohibition against unilateral
waiver between common interest parties can only protect the documents
against outsiders. When mergers fail and the parties themselves become
opponents as to the matters in which they once held a common interest, the
analysis is perforce different. 304
V.

BREAKING

OFF

THE

ENGAGEMENT:

PRIVILEGE

IN

FAILED

TRANSACTIONS

The conflicting desires of Martin Marietta and Vulcan played out in
a typically awkward way. Rather thanflat out call things off Vulcan
management became distant and uncommunicative....
As the relationship context itself would predict, the friendly deal
dance did not end in an agonizing sharing of internal feelings.
Responding to Martin Marietta's continued inquiries, James met
Nye on June 27, 2011 at the Atlanta airport and told him that
Vulcan was no longer interested in a merger, but would reach out if
its views changed. At some point after this, Carr, Vulcan's banker,

301. See, e.g., Balsiger, 2011 WL 10879630, at *6-7 ("The facts in In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas (89-3 and 89-4) indicate that the court held that neither the parent company nor its
[former] subsidiary could unilaterally waive the common interest privilege, even as to its own
communications. In other words, the court apparently held that the parent company was
entitled to assert the common interest privilege even over communications made by its
[former] subsidiary, essentially overriding the subsidiary's waiver of all privilege claims.").
302. E.g., id at *7-9.
303. Id. at *9 ("In other words, it will not allow one member of the joint defense to
effectively eviscerate the common interest privilege by revealing each and every confidential
communication made by any joint defense member. However, this holding also allows any
joint defense member to pursue his or her own interests by cooperating with the government,
as they still may offer their own confidential communications in return for leniency.");
Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 85 ("Allowing the original privilege holder to control the waiver
of the common interest doctrine after information is shared will encourage parties to share
more information.").
304. See United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 982 (citing In re Teleglobe Commc'ns
Co., 493 F.2d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007)).
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confirmed to Nye on the phone that James was just not that into the
idea ofa merger anymore.305
Not all engagements lead to marriage. (Certainly, most mere flirtations
do not.) For much of history, engagements nde betrothals in stricter times
and places were a far cry from the often informal arrangements seen in
modem Western society; marriage was closer to a business transaction, with
dowry and brideprice arrangements being negotiated vigorously. 306 The
formalization of an agreement to marry in a betrothal had legal force in both
common and ecclesiastical law. 307 Persons wishing to dissolve a betrothal
were required to follow formal processes, and an aggrieved fianc6 or fianc6e
could bring suit for damages occasioned by the betrothal's termination. 308
By contrast, contemporary engagements are more akin to an "agreement to
agree" to marry, 309 which black letter contract law would view as
unenforceable. 310

Corporate marriage invokes the stricter sense of engagement or
betrothal: once a merger agreement is signed, the parties have legal
obligations to one another that cannot be readily (or inexpensively)
terminated on the basis of cold feet or the emergence of a better prospect. 3 11

305. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1094-95
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012).
306. See Siwan Anderson, The Economics ofDowry andBrideprice, 21 J. ECON. PERSP.
151, 152 (2007) ("Most societies, at some point in their history, have been characterized by
payments at the time of marriage. Such payments typically go hand-in-hand with marriages
arranged by the parents of the respective spouses. These marriage payments come in various
forms and sizes but can be classified into two broad categories: transfers from the family of the
bride to that of the groom, broadly termed as 'dowry,' or from the groom's side to the bride's,
broadly termed as 'brideprice."'); see also George L. Haskins, The Development of Common
Law Dower, 62 HARV. L. REV. 42, 42-44 (1948).
307. See HENRY AMANS AYRNIHAC, MARRIAGE LEGISLATION IN THE NEW CODE OF
CANON LAW 33-41 (Benziger Bros. 1919); Haskins, supra note 306, at 43, 45.
308. See AYRNIHAC, supra note 307, at 34.
309. See WORDSWORTH DONISTHORPE, LAW IN A FREE STATE 191 (London, Macmillan
& Co. 1895) ("Let us endeavour to forecast what would happen in the absence of any marriage
law whatever among people in an advanced state of civilization .... The mother, father, or
guardian would, just as is now done, make the usual inquiries, and, if satisfied, consent to the
betrothal-call it marriage or by any other name. The absurd agreement to agree, promise to
promise, now called an engagement, would probably disappear, and with it the even more
anomalous action for breach of promise.").
310. See Cyberlock Consulting, Inc. v. Info. Experts, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 2d 572, 578
(E.D. Va. 2013), aff'd, 549 F. App'x 211, 211 (4th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). But cf Temkin,
supra note 147 (analyzing when agreements in principle give rise to enforceable obligations).
311. See Steuer, Simala & Roberti, supra note 153, at 35-45; e.g., United Rentals v.
RAM Holdings, Inc., No. 3360-CC, 2007 WL 4496338 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 2007). Many
agreements, however, provide an escape hatch in the event of a "material adverse effect" on
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The parties typically must use "reasonable best efforts" or "commercially
reasonable efforts" to make necessary filings, secure regulatory approvals,
defend against litigation,3 12 and have duties of cooperation in providing
access to contracts, records, and personnel.3 13 Many agreements provide for
either a termination fee payable by the acquisition target to the acquirer,3 14
or a reverse termination fee payable by the acquirer to the target,3 15
ostensibly compensating the payee for costs and business disruption in the
event that the merger fails to close.3 16 That failure can occur for any number
of reasons, including the denial of required regulatory approvals,3 17
successful litigation to halt the merger,318 or the decision of one party to
unilaterally terminate the deal.3 19
A.

The Subsequent LitigationException

Therefore, given such formalities and fees, failed transactions not
uncommonly give rise to litigation between the parties.3 20 These lawsuits
tend to fall into two main causes of action: those alleging wrongdoing ab
initio, in that one party fraudulently induced the other to enter into the failed

the acquisition target's business, the meaning of which has also occasioned much litigation.
E.g., Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008); In re
IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
312. E.g., Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 556 (5th Cir.
2002) ("reasonable best efforts" defined as those being "commercially reasonable"); Faulkner
v. Verizon Comms. Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("commercially
reasonable efforts"); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holders, 25 A.3d 813, 842 (Del. Ch. 2011)
("reasonable best efforts"); Alliance Data v. Blackstone Capital, 963 A.2d 746, 749 (Del. Ch.
2009) (same).
313. See, e.g., Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritius) Holdings Private Ltd.,
No. 8980-VCG, 2013 WL 5787958, at *3-5 & *4 n.24 (Del. Ch. 2013).
314. See, e.g., Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 624
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
315. See, e.g., In re Del Monte, 25 A.2d at 843.
316. See Jonathan T. Wachtel, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: A Look at Brazen v. Bell
Atlantic and the Controversy over Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions, 65 BROOK.
L. REv. 585, 586-87 (1999).
317. See, e.g., 3Com Corp. v. Diamond II Holdings, Inc., No. 3933-VCN, 2010 WL
2280734, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2010).
318. See, e.g., United States v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 11-00948, 2011 WL 5438955, at
*43-44 (D.D.C. Nov. 10, 2011).
319. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Verizon Commc'ns Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig.), 789 A.2d 14, 23 (Del.
Ch. 2001).
320. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 321-324.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

53

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3
354

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 301

transaction by deception, 321' and those alleging material breach of the merger
agreement. 322 Cases in the latter category can be further classified by
whether they seek general damages incurred by virtue of the breach, 323 or
represent an attempt to recoup a contractual termination fee over the
resistance of the other party. 324 In any such actions, former allies in common
interest have become adversaries as to the same matter, leading to seismic
shifts in the assessment of privilege. 325
As a general rule, the relationship of the parties at the time a
communication is made determines common interest and thus its continuing
privilege. 326 That generality, however, yields to the harsh specificities of
adversarial litigation.327 Communications between erstwhile common
interest parties now opposed in litigation cannot be privileged from use,
because they were never intended to be shielded from the counterparty. 328
Common interest privilege represents a joint right of the parties as against
the rest of the world, not against each other.329 Thus, in the event of open

321. See, e.g., Great Hill Equity Partners IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLP, 80
A.3d 155, 156 (Del. Ch. 2013); Narrowstep, Inc. v. Onstream Media Corp., No. 5114-VCP,
2010 WL 5422405, at *15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss on fraudulent
inducement and unjust enrichment).
322. See, e.g., The Williams Cos., v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., No. 12168-VCG,
2016 WL 3576682, at *1 (Del. Ch. June 24, 2016); Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v.
Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 723 (Del. Ch. 2008).
323. See, e.g., Hexion, 965 A.2d at 724.
324. See, e.g., United Rentals v. RAM Holdings, Inc., 937 A.2d 810, 841 (Del. Ch.
2007).
325. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp.
381, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (referring to a "restructuring" of privilege rights).
326. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
327. Cf Zedalis v. Foster, 343 So. 2d 849, 850 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) ("When
reconciliation is not possible the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant would normally
apply, thereby retaining the effectiveness of the special act notwithstanding a subsequent
general act on the same subject.").
328. See Fogel v. Zell (In re Madison Mgmt. Grp.), 212 B.R. 894, 896 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1997); Yorke v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. (In re Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.), 121 B.R. 794, 799
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 689 F. Supp.
841, 844 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 32 (N.D. Ill.
1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 393
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007)
("The great caveat of the joint-client privilege is that it only protects communications from
compelled disclosure to parties outside the joint representation. When former co-clients sue
one another, the default rule is that all communications made in the course of the joint
representation are discoverable.").
329. See EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 309 ("The privilege usually applies for the group
against the world, namely when it is used as a shield against outsiders."); e.g., In re Grand
Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394; Medcom, 689 F. Supp. at 845; Ohio-Sealy, 90 F.R.D. at
29; Yorke, 121 B.R. at 799.
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hostilities, neither can prevent the other from using that selfsame privileged
material in its case for fraud or breach, as it was freely shared in happier
times. 330 This "subsequent litigation exception" to common interest privilege
applies even to documents that reflect only attorney-client advice of one of
the parties, so long as they were disclosed to the other.3 3' As the Southern
District of New York has cogently summarized,
the law exacts a higher cost for participation in a joint defense. To
be sure, confidences shared by joint defendants and their counsel
are effectively shielded against outside access. On the law
established to date, that shield may be lowered only when the
parties once joined assume the stance of opposing parties in
subsequent litigation. This restructuring of the parties' rights is a
logical incident of their later posture: when they face one another in
litigation, neither can reasonably be allowed to deny to the other the
use of information which he already has by virtue of the former's
own disclosure.33 2

Even following this logic, however, that court and others still held that
materials subject to common interest remain privileged as against any third
party, should such a party seek their discovery for their own reasons.333

330. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394; see also, e.g., OhioSealy, 90 F.R.D. at 32; Yorke, 121 B.R. at 799; Medcom, 689 F. Supp. at 845.
331. See Ohio-Sealy, 90 F.R.D. at 32 ("The subsequent litigation exception is based on
the view that a joint defendant who later becomes adverse cannot 'reasonably be allowed to
deny [the] other [defendant] the use of information which he already has by virtue of the
former's own disclosure."'); e.g., In re GrandJury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394.
332. In re GrandJury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394; e.g., Ohio-Sealy, 90 F.R.D. at 32.
333. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 312 ("After a falling out between parties with a common
interest, any privileged communications exchanged between them or by one of them with joint
counsel retains its privileged character in respect to litigation with third parties. But the
privilege will not apply in litigation between the parties."); e.g., United States v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 296 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985); In re GrandJury Subpoena, 406 F.
Supp. at 394 ("There is no similar justification for requiring the disclosure of a former codefendant's confidences for use in a third-party proceeding. Indeed, to allow such disclosure
would so further erode the privilege's protection as to reduce joint defense to an improbable
alternative."); Ohio-Sealy, 90 F.R.D. at 32 ("It is quite another matter, however, to make this
information available to an adverse party who never participated in a joint defense."); Visual
Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., PLC, 508 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Fogel,
212 BR. at 897 ("[T]he adversity or subsequent litigation exception has only been applied
between the parties whose interests were originally joined. In those situations, as the Court
notes above, there is no longer any purpose for containing information to which both parties
have already had access. They are now using it against each other. It is quite a different matter,
however, to reveal the information to a third party unless both of the parties whom the
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Former common interest parties can even shield their privileged documents
from co-litigants in their action against one another! 334 That the quondam
allies are now adversarial is "inapposite" to the right of third parties to
documents originally exchanged pursuant to a common interest.335 Outsiders

to the privilege thus remain barred from fishing expeditions into the merger
parties' exchanges, 336 even if one of the parties now seeks such
excursions. 337 Under the rule against unilateral waiver, 338 only if and when

the former allies mutually publicize jointly privileged documents in the
course of litigation between them will there be a general abrogation of the
privilege as to the world at large.339 (Of course, by the same rule, a company
remains free to forfeit protection for documents whose privilege derives only
)

from its own counsel. 340

Finally, it is often the case that there are multiple parties to common
interest in a transaction; 341 what then ensues if only a subset later becomes
adversarial? Several courts have provided the answer: the adversarial parties
may use common interest materials against one another in litigation, even
over the objections of uninvolved allies. 342 As an early court sensibly
explained,
"[b]y definition, the defense effort is joint among all defendants;
thus, there are likely to be few documents which reflect
communications solely between two parties who later become
adverse litigants. No doubt it was for this reason that the court in
Grand Jury Subpoena noted that the [subsequent litigation]

privilege is protecting consent to waive it."); see also, e.g., Yorke, 121 B.R. at 799 (observing
that "[t]he claim of privilege as to those outside the family is a totally different problem"
without addressing that problem).

334. Visual Scene, 508 So. 2d at 442.
335. See Gulf Oil, 760 F.2d at 296.
336. See id.; In re GrandJury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394; Ohio-Sealy, 90 F.R.D. at
29; Fogel, 214 B.R. at 394.
337. See, e.g., Fogel, 214 B.R. at 897.
338. See supra Part IV.B.
339. See Fogel, 214 B.R. at 897 (quoted supra note 333); see also In re Grand Jury

Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394.
340. See supra notes 295-303 and accompanying text.

341. Yorke v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. (In re Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.), 121 B.R. 794, 799
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990).
342. In re GrandJury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at 394; Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v.
Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 32 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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exception applies where 'any one
of the former clients stands as an
343
opposing party in such action."'

Lest this seem unfair to bystanders to the suit, In re Grand Jury
Subpoena also emphasized the "higher cost" associated with the risk of later
litigation incurred in invoking the benefits of common interest privilege. 344
B.

Analyzing ErstwhileAllies in Opposition

The precarious position of privilege when allies become adversaries is
convoluted at best, especially when third parties come on the scene, whether
as co-litigants or curious interlopers. Some exemplary applications,
however, can illustrate the consequences for the common interest privilege
both between now-adversarial onetime common interest parties and when
third parties seek to interpose themselves.
The court in Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Kaplan
confirmed the discoverability of documents shared between parties to a
transaction now engaged in active litigation, despite the objections of
uninvolved parties to the common interest. 345 When squarely opposed in

adversarial litigation, privilege cannot bar disclosure as between the
parties. 346 By contrast, the facts in Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol
Laboratories, Inc. compelled the opposite conclusion. 347 Baxter had sold a
subsidiary to Medcom, the latter of which was now suing the former over
fraud in the transaction. 348 Medcom argued that the common interest
privilege as between the subsidiary and Baxter prior to the transaction was
abrogated by the litigation. 349 The court, however, refused to order
production, reasoning that despite Medcom's ownership, the subsidiary and
Baxter were not adversarial such that the subsequent litigation exception
would apply: Medcom could not "stand[] in the shoes" of its subsidiary to
effect abrogation, 350 and thus Baxter could insist the common interest
materials remain privileged and inadmissible over the desires of the former

343. Ohio-Sealy, 90 F.R.D. at 32 (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 406 F. Supp. at
393-94).
344. See supra text accompanying note 332.
345. Ohio-Sealy, 90 F.R.D. at 32.
346. Id
347. Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 841, 845-46
(N.D. Ill. 1988).
348. Id. at 841.
349. Id. at 842.
350. Id. at 845.
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subsidiary (as directed by Medcom), under the rule against unilateral
waiver. 35 1

Confronting the involvement of third parties and fishing expeditions, the
court of appeals in United States v. Gulf Oil Corp. was called on to
adjudicate privilege between parties to a failed transaction. 352 In 1982, Cities
Service Oil & Gas had entered a merger agreement with Gulf, and under
terms that allowed plenary reciprocal access to business records, Gulf
received certain legal analyses generated by Cities in connection with a
Department of Energy investigation in 1980.353 After the merger collapsed

and litigation inter partes ensued, the Department renewed its investigation
and subpoenaed Cities' analyses from Gulf, arguing any privilege was
waived by disclosure to Gulf, given the parties were now in opposition. 354
The court demurred, finding it "inapposite that an adversarial relationship
ultimately developed between Cities and Gulf. This was not the case at the
time the disclosure was made. We therefore affirm the district court's
conclusion that the work product privilege attached to these documents was
not waived by virtue of their disclosure."

355

The bankruptcy court in Fogel v. Zell provides a valuable survey of
much of the precedent as well. 356 There, a subsidiary had gone into

bankruptcy, and the appointed trustee filed suit against the parent
corporation and its directors for fraudulent conveyance in an effort to recoup
assets. 357 To that end, the trustee sought to share with third-party creditors
confidences between the subsidiary, the parent, and its directors that were
relevant to the alleged fraud. 358 Analyzing the relationship between parent
and child company as one of common interest, 359 the court reasoned that the
lawsuit abrogated the privilege as between them, but did not allow

351. Id at 845-46.
352. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 293 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985).
353. Id at 293-94.
354. Id at 294.
355. Id at 296.
356. Fogel v. Zell (In re Madison Mgmt. Grp.), 212 B.R. 894 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997)
(discussing CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985)); see, e.g., Yorke v. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. (In re Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.), 121 B.R. 794, 798-800 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990);
Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 841, 844-45 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 32 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
357. Fogel, 212 B.R. at 895-96.
358. Id.
359. See supra notes 224-231 and accompanying text (discussing courts viewing
affiliated companies within the common interest model).
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disclosure to third parties, even in connection with the suit. 360 And looking

to basic principles of waiver of common interest, the trustee's unilateral
desire for disclosure was insufficient; all parties to the common interest had
to assent. 36 1

Finally, in an extraordinary example, a Florida court of appeals upheld
common interest between opposing parties in a lawsuit in Visual Scene, Inc.
v. Pilkington Bros., PLC. 362 Despite being engaged in active litigation

against one another, the court approved a limited common interest for a
defendant and plaintiff in developing legal strategy against a crossclaim
common to both. 363 Whilst under the adversarial waiver rule, such
strategizing was presumably fair game for use against one another in the
primary litigation, third parties-including the codefendant of one member
of this odd couple!-could nonetheless be excluded. 364 Citing the Southern
District of New York, the court explained:
To extend the common interests privilege to parties aligned on
opposite sides of the litigation for another purpose is not
inconsistent with any policy underlying the attomey-client privilege
and merely facilitates representation of the sharing parties by their
respective counsel. Sharing parties on opposite sides of litigation,
being uncertain bedfellows, run a greater than usual risk that one
may use the information against the other should subsequent
litigation arise between them, yet there is no sound reason not to
protect from the rest of the world ... information intended by VSI
and Metro to be kept confidential and to be used to further the
common litigation interests.365
To say adversaries in active litigation "run a greater than usual risk" of
their interlocutor misapplying their confidences
is quite the
understatement. 366

There is thus precedent that common interest parties can at least depend
that their corporate secrets will remain protected as against the world at

360. Fogel, 212 B.R. at 896-97.
361. Id at 897; see supra Section II.B.
362. Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., PLC, 508 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987).
363. Id. at 441.
364. Id at 442.
365. Id (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F.
Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
366. Cf Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 70-71 (discussing Visual Scene).
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large. This may be little solace to a company being hoisted by its own
petards in the form of legal opinions shared with a onetime ally. 367
Fortunately, there remain potential remedies even in litigation inter partes,
but they lie in contract rather than privilege law per se. 368 The possibility of
eventual litigation between the parties is a powerful argument for
preemptive execution of a common interest agreement to prevent just such
weaponization of secrets. 369
VI. CORPORATE

PRENUPS:

COMMON INTEREST

AND

JOINT DEFENSE

AGREEMENTS

Therefore, when James and Nye met in April 2010, Nye emphasized
the need for confidentiality. This need met with no resistancefrom
James, who as a fellow CEO, was not inclined to put himself in a
vulnerable position that he could not control. Although neither
James nor Nye discussed the needfor a standstillpreventingMartin
Marietta or Vulcan from proceeding against the other without
consent, both agreed upon the needfor a confidentiality agreement
to cloak any merger discussions between the companies and any
information exchanged.370
Matrimonial lawyers have long advocated that prospective helpmates
enter into prenuptial agreements defining the obligations of the parties in the
unhappily plausible event that the marriage does not last until death do them
part.37' The prudent practitioner of privilege law should be no less solicitous
to participants in corporate marriages. A common interest or joint defense
agreement can augment the parties' ability to assert privilege against

367. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 1,
sc. 4, 11. 202-09 ("There's letters seal'd, and my two schoolfellows, / Whom I will trust as I
will adders fang'd
/ They bear the mandate, they must sweep my way / And marshal me to
knavery. Let it work; / For 'tis the sport to have the enginer / Hoist with his own petard, an't
shall go hard / But I will delve one yard below their mines / And blow them at the moon.").

368. Cf In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) ("According
to the Restatement, it is permissible for co-clients to agree in advance to shield information
from one another in subsequent adverse litigation, though the drafters concede finding no
direct authority for that proposition.").

369. See infra Part VI.
370. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1081 (Del.
Ch.), aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012).
371. See Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial
Agreements, 49 STANFORD L. REV. 887 (1997).
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outsiders,3 72 as well as provide for protecting the parties' secrets in the event
they become adversarial.3 73 Given all the nuances and challenges for
privilege discussed when companies combine and the possibility of the
transaction's failure, the precaution of contractually defining the parties'
rights and obligations may seem less a convenience than a necessity. 374
A.

Bolstering the Joint PrivilegeAgainst Outsiders

Talk of necessity is not literally true: courts have emphasized that the
sine qua non of privilege is the existence of a common legal interest or joint
defense; an informal and unwritten understanding between the parties
suffices for commonality. 375 Nonetheless, "it is better practice to enter into a
formal agreement stipulating the privileged materials will be shared because
of the existence of some community of interest and that the parties recognize
that the shared materials should be kept confidential," because such a
writing "can be helpful in protecting privilege claims." 376 It is therefore
standard procedure for attorneys to promulgate common interest agreements
in the context of mergers. 377 Absent such a writing, a finding of common
interest depends more heavily on a court's independent sifting of evidence of
commonality, 378 which may not yield a favorable result. 379 Courts

&

372. See EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 304; Jason M. Rosenthal, Joint Defense Agreements
and the Common Interest Privilege: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, in A YOUNG
LAWYER'S GUIDE TO DEFENSE PRACTICE 143, 151-52 (2008); Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 82.
373. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 41, at 45; Fischer, supra note 17, at 658;
Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76, at 365; Rosenthal, supra note 372, at 15152.
374. See, e.g., Hundley, supra note 32, at 110; Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra
note 76, at 365; Steuer, Simala & Roberti, supra note 153, at 44 ("Antitrust risk allocation
requires cooperation and consultation among competition counsel for both parties. This
requirement for cooperation has made it a common practice for parties early on in a transaction
to enter into a joint [defense] agreement so that they may share information.").
375. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 572 (1st Cir. 2001); Denney v. Jenkins
Gilchrist, 362 F. Supp. 2d 407, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Lugosch v. Congel, 219 F.R.D. 220, 237
(N.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1079 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2003)
("No written agreement is generally required to invoke the joint defense privilege."); Katz v.
AT&T Corp., 191 F.R.D. 433, 437 (E.D. Pa. 2000); see EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 304-07
(discussing cases); Fischer, supra note 17, at 649-50; Giesel, supra note 17, at 553.
376. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 304.
377. See Hundley, supra note 32, at 110; Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note
76, at 365; Steuer, Simala & Roberti, supra note 153, at 44; see also Fischer, supra note 17, at
649-50; Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 81-82.
378. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 41, at 44; Hundley, supra note 32, at 110;
Steuer, Simala & Roberti, supra note 153, at 44 ("The analysis as to when interests are aligned
can be nuanced and until an agreement is signed, there is a risk that a court may find that the
parties do not share a common interest.").
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themselves have commended the wisdom of such written safeguards even
when they find a preexisting common interest.380
That said, the parties must in fact concur in the existence of the common
interest, whether in writing or not: even the most punctilious document
could not create privilege where the parties have not actually reached
agreement as to their common interest. 381 Where the parties differ as to the
intention that their exchanges be privileged, therefore, courts will likely treat
such divergence as negating privilege, since there cannot be any
confidentiality upheld in exchanges with a party who does not acknowledge
any is due. 382 Moreover, once one party withdraws from or disclaims a
common interest agreement, subsequent communications will not enjoy
privilege. 38 3 Common interest, in short, cannot be imposed upon an
unwilling partner, 384 even if that partner was amenable at one time or
executed an agreement to that effect. 385

379. E.g., Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., No. CIVA PJM-08-409, 2010 WL
1711502, at *1-2 (D. Md. Apr. 23, 2010); Avocent Redmond Corp. v. Rose Elecs., Inc., 516 F.
Supp. 2d 1199, 1204 (W.D. Wash. 2007); United States v. Weissman, 22 F. Supp. 2d 187,
189-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Steuer, Simala & Roberti, supra note 153, at 44.
380. E.g., HSH Nordbank AG N.Y. Branch v. Swerdlow, 259 F.R.D. 64, 72 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[W]hile Nordbank and the non-party lenders wisely chose to reduce their
common agreement to writing, their decision to do so does not mean that there was no prior
agreement. To the contrary, Nordbank has made a persuasive showing that the parties shared a
common interest."); Boyd v. Comdata Network, Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 217 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2002).
381. See Brown v. Adams (In re Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp.), No. 07-04015-DML,
2008 WL 2095601, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. May 15, 2008) ("The law is clear that, in order to
retain the protection of the attorney-client or work product privilege when sharing documents
with another party, there must at least be an agreement among the parties. Whether the parties
must, in fact, agree to a joint prosecution and pursue that end, certainly at a bare minimum
there must be a meeting of the minds that documents subject to attorney-client or work product
privilege are being shared in the expectation that the privilege is not being waived by the
sharing and that each party will protect the documents from disclosure or loss of the
privilege.").
382. E.g., id.; Avocent, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1203; J.E. Dunn Const. Co. v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's London, No. 05-0092-CV-W-FJG, 2006 WL 1128777, at *1-2 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
383. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 320; e.g., United States v. Lecroy, 348 F. Supp. 2d 375,
387-88 (E.D. Pa. 2004); United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1086 (N.D. Cal.
2003).
384. Brown, 2008 WL 2095601, at *2; see also Avocent, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1203
(explaining that parties must explicitly intend and agree to establish a common interest);
Fischer, supra note 17, at 643 (noting that even if parties share interests, they cannot be
"forced" into cooperation and information sharing unwillingly).
385. Cf Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (ordering that a "joint defense agreement must
explicitly allow withdrawal upon notice to the other defendants").
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What should the corporate prenup specify? In joint defense
arrangements grounded in litigation, many of the details are self-evident by
the nature of the lawsuit.38 6 By contrast, "[b]ecause the existence of common
interests is not as obvious as in the litigation context, it is especially
important that clients and attorneys document the inception, duration, scope,
boundaries and termination of any common interest agreement."38 7 Some
commentators have provided yet more meticulous descriptions of terms and
conditions that parties are well-advised to include or at least consider
addressing in their compact.388 In particular, agreements should, and
generally do, provide the terms of document protection and disclosure to
which the parties must adhere, to ensure the requisite confidentiality for
privilege is preserved.38 9 On rare occasions, courts have interceded to
demand stipulations regarding such things as the nature of the relationship
between the parties and provisions for withdrawal from the agreement.3 90
Care must be taken, however, that a written agreement not curtail
privilege that would otherwise exist. For example, if a common interest
agreement specifies that the common interest between the parties arises on a
certain date, courts may use the specified date as a line in the sand and deny
common interest to communications prior to it. 391 Thus, if merger partners
only belatedly execute a common interest agreement, they should specify
that communications prior to the date of execution on matters of common
legal interest are still encompassed.3 92 Similarly, whilst a well-drafted
agreement will specify the zones in which the parties share common

386. Evans & Klevens, supra note 286, at 2; see also, e.g., Trading Techs. Int'l Inc. v.
eSpeed, Inc., No. 04-C-5312, 2007 WL 1302765, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2007) ("GL has
indicated that '[e]ach defendant entered the JDA with the other defendants as of the date of
their particular suit with TT began.' Such timing is not surprising, considering TT's visible and
calculated effort to enforce its patent rights against competitors throughout the futures
industry.") (internal citation omitted).
387. Evans & Klevens, supra note 286, at 3.
388. See, e.g., Drumright & Griffin, supra note 41, at 44-45 (expansively detailing items
to include in an agreement and citing authorities).
389. Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76, at 365; e.g., Martin Marietta
Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1138 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208
(Del. 2012).
390. See, e.g., Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 1086.
391. E.g., For Your Ease Only, Inc. v. Calgon Carbon Corp., No. 02 C 7345, 2003 WL
21920244, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2003); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Terra Nova Ins. Co. Ltd.,
211 F. Supp. 2d 493, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
392. See For Your Ease Only, 2003 WL 21920244, at *2-3; Bank ofAm., 211 F. Supp.
2d at 498.
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interest, 393 such areas should be drawn broadly lest an interpreting court find
the parties have disclaimed commonality on an unanticipated matter. 394
Although not without a whiff of begging the question, common interest
and joint defense agreements are typically themselves viewed as
privileged. 395 Indeed, even the negotiation of a common interest agreement
and preliminary drafts have been held immune from discovery even when
no written agreement is ultimately signed. 396 This makes greater sense when
one recalls that common interests do not depend upon a written agreement;
the writing merely memorializes a preexisting relationship. 397 A few courts,
however, confronting agreements defining the metes and bounds of the
multiple attomey-client unit have declined to find them privileged, likening
them to attorney retention agreements. 398 By parallel reasoning, even if an
arrangement is unwritten, its participants may still be called on to divulge its
foundational parameters, such as the participants in the privilege and date of
inception.399
Finally, as this Article has illustrated, jurisdictions and even courts
differ on the scope of privilege protections, and thus the forum in which
privilege is litigated can be dispositive. For example, in 3Com Corp. v.

393. See supra notes 386-388 and accompanying text.
394. Cf Rosenthal, supra note 372, at 151 (discussing danger of mistakenly sharing
information thought to be within the scope of a common interest agreement).
395. Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Nebula Glasslam Int'l Inc., No. 07-22326-CIV, 2008 WL 756455
at *5-7, *7 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2008); McNally Tunneling Corp. v. City of Evanston, No.
00-C-6979, 2001 WL 1246630, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2001); Boyd v. Comdata Network,
Inc., 88 S.W.3d 203, 217 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing cases); see also Drumright & Griffin,
supra note 41, at 44.
396. Boyd, 88 S.W.3d at 217 ("If a joint defense agreement itself is privileged, it would
be anomalous to conclude that drafts of a joint defense agreement are discoverable. Obviously,
a joint defense agreement must be preceded by negotiations regarding the terms of the
agreement. Holding that communications involving a proposed joint defense agreement are not
privileged unless the parties actually enter into a joint defense agreement will place the parties
in a 'Catch-22' situation and will seriously impair efforts to negotiate a joint defense
agreement. Accordingly, communications occurring during the negotiation of a proposed joint
defense agreement are privileged, even if the parties have not, or ultimately do not, unite in a
common enterprise or execute a formal agreement.").
397. See cases cited supra note 375.
398. United States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2003); see, e.g.,
Rosenthal, supra note 372, at 152 (noting risk of divergent court approaches); cf In re LTV
Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 603 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (observing in a joint defense case that "at the
risk of confusing by stating the obvious," no privilege applies to "terms and conditions of an
attorney's employment").
399. E.g., Trading Techs. Int'l Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04-C-5312, 2007 WL 1302765,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2007).
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Diamond II Holdings, Inc.,400 a Delaware chancery court had to determine
whether Massachusetts or Delaware law would apply, as the
communications occurred in the former state, but the parties' agreements
designated the latter for choice of law. 40' The choice mattered, for the
materials at issue would be admissible in the former, but privileged in the
latter. 402 The court, perhaps predictably, ruled in favor of the forum state,
Delaware:
The parties selected Delaware law to govern the Merger Agreement,
and chose Delaware as the forum for any disputes arising out of the
Merger Agreement. Delaware has a considerable interest in
ensuring that corporate entities seeking a business combination
under its laws may expect consistent and predictable treatment
when appearing before its Courts.... Applying Delaware law in
this context would avoid the uncertainty generated by the varying
loci of communications involved both in this case and others like it.
This, in turn, would foster predictability for parties to major
corporate transactions that have availed themselves of Delaware
law.

40 3

Drafters of merger and common interest agreements seeking greater
surety for their secrets should thus ensure their designated forum enjoys
favorable privilege precedent, 404 as do Delaware and the Northern District of
California, to name but two possibilities. 405

400. 3Com Corp. v. Diamond II Holdings, Inc., No. 3933-VCN, 2010 WL 2280734 (Del.
Ch. May 31, 2010).
401. Id at *2-3.
402. Id at *3-5.
403. Id at *5.
404. Pavento, Marti, Siddiqui & Eagan, supra note 76, at 365-66. But see Schaffzin,
supra note 17, at 65 ("Even when states adopt the common interest doctrine, the lack of
uniformity in its application further compounds such uncertainty."); id at 49 n.3.
405. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D.
Cal. 1987). Of course, no jurisdiction will be uniformly protective of all matters of privilege.
Compare 3Com, 2010 WL 2280734 (noting that an expectation of confidentiality can be
enough to justify a privileged common interest), and Hewlett-Packard, 115 F.R.D. at 311-12
(finding that a defendant and a prospective buyer had sufficiently overlapping legal interests
that justified finding a common interest), with Union Carbide Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F.
Supp. 1036, 1050 (D. Del. 1985) (holding that communications with respect to evaluation of
business ramifications do not justify finding a common interest), and Nidec v. Victor Co. of
Japan, 249 F.R.D. 575, 579-80 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (failing to extend a common interest privilege
to disclosures made in connection with prospective buyers of a business). M&A practitioners
might at least eschew jurisdictions with particularly unfavorable law. See supra notes 172-177
(discussing stricter privilege law in New York and a minority of other states).
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Protectingthe Partiesin Subsequent AdversarialLitigation

Common interest agreements are not merely important in strengthening
the parties' claims of privilege against outsiders. They may be most uniquely
valuable in providing protection in the event that the merger collapses or is
blocked. As discussed, absent contrary agreement, common interest
communications are fair game in litigation between the parties, 406 which
may be to neither party's benefit. 407 A common interest agreement, however,
can specify that the materials shared may be used solely for the purpose of
effectuating the contemplated transaction, 408 or even more specifically,
prescribe that the common interest privilege will survive the onset of inter
partes litigation. 409 Of course, not every set of merger partners will want
these limitations, but some courts at least have been receptive to those that
do enter into such contracts. 4 10 Other courts, however, have not.4 11

In Price v. Charles Brown CharitableRemainder Unitrust Trust,412 an
Indiana court of appeals confronted a paradigmatic case of two former allies
turned adversaries. In 2006, the Department of Justice had begun a criminal
conspiracy investigation into both Brown and his lawyer Price, who
executed a joint defense agreement in 2008 to govern the sharing of
documents in their defense. 4 13 But by 2009, the yesteryear allies were suing
one another over a litany of wrongs (meanwhile, they were eventually
exonerated in the criminal inquiry). 414 Pointing to a JDA clause specifying
privilege would not be abrogated in the event of hostilities, 4 15 Price sought

406. See supra Section V.A.
407. See Drumright & Griffin, supra note 41, at 46 ("Institute a clear protocol for
resolving issues relating to the joint defense agreement as they arise in litigation and amongst
the parties.").
408. E.g., Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1077
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012) (transferee could only use materials "for the
purpose of considering a 'business combination transaction' that was 'between' the parties");
see also id at 1105.
409. See Price v. Charles Brown Charitable Remainder Unitrust Tr., 27 N.E.3d 1168,
1174 (Ind. App. 2013).
410. See, e.g., Hundley, supra note 32, at 108-09 (discussing In re Sealed Case, 120
F.R.D. 66, 71 (N.D. Ill.), objections overruled and order aff'd sub nom., Medcom Holding Co.
v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ill. 1988)).
411. See Fischer, supra note 17, at 658-59, 658 n.81 (citing and discussing courts
refusing to enforce agreements prohibiting divulgence of shared materials); EPSTEIN, supra
note 14, at 305-06.
412. Price, 27 N.E.3d at 1168.
413. Id. at 1170-71.
414. Id. at 1172.
415. Id. at 1174 ("The joint defense privilege described above and recognized by this
Agreement shall not be destroyed or impaired as to any Joint Defense Materials exchanged
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to preclude the claims against him on the grounds that "the terms of the JDA
and the sharing of information under the JDA bar the Browns and the Trust's
4 16
claims, and 'the only appropriate remedy available to Price is dismissal."'
Demurring from such a severe result, the appellate court agreed that the JDA
precluded use of the joint defense materials in the suit, giving effect to the
parties' intent to preserve privilege, but allowed the suit to go forward with
that limitation. 417

Also relevant to corporate marriages is Martin Marietta Materials, Inc.
v. Vulcan Materials Co.,418 where the parties had executed both nondisclosure and joint defense agreements in considering a consensual merger;
each agreement provided (in slightly different terms) that the materials
exchanged could be used only in connection with a transaction between the
companies. 419 After they failed to reach terms, Martin Marietta launched a
hostile takeover bid and proxy contest, publicizing numerous excerpts from
materials supplied under the agreementS 420 and sought a declaratory
judgment that its disclosures did not violate the NDA and JDA, whilst
Vulcan counterclaimed that they did.421 Having meticulously and
thoughtfully parsed both the agreements and parties' arguments, 422
Chancellor Strine concluded that Martin Marietta's wide-ranging disclosures
breached both agreements and granted injunctions in favor of Vulcan
requiring Martin Marietta to desist from its hostile bid for four months and
forbear from any further disclosures. 423 Sitting en banc, the Delaware
Supreme Court affirmed unanimously. 424

pursuant to this Agreement if any adversary positions shall subsequently arise between some
or all of the Parties and regardless of whether the joint defense privilege becomes inapplicable
after the emergence of adversary positions among Parties or this Agreement is terminated for
any reason.").
416. Id at 1172.
417. Id. at 1174 ("What the JDA does establish is that Brown and Price cannot use the
materials shared pursuant to the JDA against each other, and that the exchange of materials
does not limit any privileges or work-product protections that would otherwise apply.").
418. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072 (Del. Ch.),
aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012). Chancellor Strine's opinion is a model of clarity, exposition,
legal reasoning, and even wit, and should be required reading for anyone considering
confidentiality clauses in merger discussions. Not coincidentally, the epigrams to this and the
preceding Parts draw from this opinion.
419. Id. at 1082-84.
420. Id. at 1099-1101.
421. Id. at 1077-78.
422. Id. at 1144.
423. Id. at 1138-47.
424. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208, 1228 (Del.
2012).
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Notwithstanding such holdings, some doubt remains as to whether
courts will respect common interest parties' preemptive self-denial of
common interest materials in the event of subsequent litigation. The Third
Circuit observed in the seminal 2007 case In re Teleglobe Communications
Corp. that whilst the Restatement approved such arrangements for coclients, it could cite no authority for their enforceability. 425 The sole relevant
case the court of appeals could uncover featured a court refusing to give
effect to prior contractual limitations on the parties' discovery from one
another, albeit not in the form of a common interest agreement. 426 Some
courts have indeed declined to give full effect to agreements purporting to
preserve privilege between onetime allies turned adversaries. 427 (This is little
different from prenuptial agreements, where ample case law has developed
as to clauses that courts will find unenforceable. 428 ) But others have clearly
upheld such precautionary limitations. 429 The latter group and Restatement
likely have the better of public policy: in Martin Marietta, Chancellor Strine
discussed at length but ultimately rejected arguments that giving effect to
written agreements barring disclosure of commonly shared materials in
subsequent adversarial settings would put a "chill on M&A activity" 430 and
instead found rigorous enforcement would benefit the market.431
In any event, there is little disadvantage in allies executing a common
interest agreement should that be their predilection, even if its ultimate
efficacy may be the subject of dispute should hostilities ensue. 432 And

425. In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007).
426. Id at 647 n.23 (citing In re Mirant Corp., 326 B.R. 646, 652 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2005)).
427. See In re Taproot Sys., Inc., No. 11-05255-8-JRL, 2013 WL 3505621 (E.D.N.C.
July 11, 2013) (citing cases); Fischer, supra note 17, at 658-59, 658 n.81; see, e.g., United
States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1080-84 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
428. See generally Jonathan E. Fields, Forbidden Provisions in PrenuptialAgreements:
Legal and Practical Considerationfor the Matrimonial Lawyer, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
L. 413 (2008).
429. E.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3 and 89-4, 734 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 n. 5 (E.D.
Va.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 902 F.2d 244 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Sealed Case, 120 F.R.D.
66, 70-72 (N.D. Ill.), objections overruled and order aff'd sub nom., Medcom Holding Co. v.
Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Price v. Charles Brown
Charitable Remainder Unitrust Tr., 27 N.E.3d 1168, 1173-75 (Ind. App. 2013); see, e.g.,
Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1147 (Del. Ch.), aff'd,
68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012).
430. Martin Marietta, 56 A.3d at 1142.
431. Id. at 1142-43.
432. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 89-3 and 89-4, 734 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 n.5 (E.D.
Va.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 902 F.2d 244, 249-50 (4th Cir. 1990); In re Taproot Sys.,
Inc., No. 11-05255-8-JRL, 2013 WL 3505621, at *2-4 (E.D.N.C. July 11, 2013); United
States v. Stepney, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1080-84 (N.D. Cal. 2003); In re Sealed Case, 120
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subsequent litigation aside, the parties can only benefit from the relative
clarity afforded to both them and an interpreting court by a well-drafted and
prudently phrased written agreement codifying the scope of their intended
privilege. 433

VII. THE

CONCEIT OF CORPORATE MARRIAGE

If issues of privilege law in corporate combinations are thorny, it is
because the natures of these arrangements are as well. Whether the
companies are conducting due diligence, seeking regulatory approval, or
defending litigation, the relationship is fundamentally inchoate: neither one
of wholly independent operators nor of having unified into a single
operator. 434 Such uncertainties are categorically worse than that of a closed
transaction, which at least brings finality to the parties' legal status and
unification to their interests in the mine run of postures. 435 Yet, even the
consummation of a corporate marriage leaves lingering questions, 436 just as
civil marriage has raised problems in legal philosophy since the law's
inception.
In marriage, spouses are biblically said to "become one flesh," 437 a
notion that the law embraced formally for centuries. Most fundamentally,
the concept of coverture, odious though it now be to modern sensibilities,
subsumed the identity and property of the wife into the person of the
husband, creating a single legal entity. 438 Interspousal tort immunity
imagines that one spouse cannot offend the other at law. 439 The oft-baffling
legal estate of tenancy by the entirety between spouses (the scourge of bar

F.R.D. at 70-72; Medcom Holding Co. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 689 F. Supp. 841, 84344 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Price v. Charles Brown Charitable Remainder Unitrust Tr., 27 N.E.3d
1168, 1173 (Ind. App. 2013); Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d
1072, 1106-07 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012); see also Fischer, supra note 17, at
658-59, 658 n.81.
433. Rosenthal, supra note 372, at 151-52; see supra Section VI.A.
434. See generally Martin Marietta, 56 A.3d at 1108-13.
435. Id.
436. See supra Section III.F.
437. Genesis 2:24 (New Int'l Version); Mark 10:8 (New Int'l Version).
438. See generally Claudia Zaher, When a Woman's Marital Status Determined Her
Legal Status: A Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAw LIBR. J.
459 (2002).
439. See generally Carl Tobias, The Imminent Demise of Interspousal Tort Immunity, 60
MONT. L. REV. 101, 108 (1999); David M. Weaver, Interspousal Tort Immunity, 30 BAYLOR
L. REV. 291, 304 (1978).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

69

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3
370

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 301

applicants for decadeS 440) sees the married couple holding land singly and
undividedly rather than individually. 44' And, of course, marital privilege
forbids the state from penetrating the sanctity of communications between
the married couple and prevents either spouse from being compelled to
testify against the other at all. 442 In justifying such restrictions, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly reasoned that such intrusions would fundamentally
compromise the harmony and privity of the marriage. 443
And yet for all these attempts at enforcing connubial unity, the
indefeasible fact remains that a marriage is comprised of two separate
persons. The legal fictions discussed above are rowing against the tide of
that reality, zealously striving to make one plus one equal one. Their
application has thus given rise to a notoriously complicated body of law, and
many such fictions have been deprecated or are rapidly obsolescing:
coverture was long ago relegated rightly to the ashbin of legal history; 444
interspousal tort immunity is close to defunct; 445 tenancy by the entirety is in
a long slide into desuetude; 446 and even marital privilege faces challenges to
its cogency in an era with ever more diverse notions of relationships. 447 The
law has largely despaired of trying to extend already strained fictions of

440. See, e.g., 1 JAMES J. RIGOS, MULTISTATE BAR EXAM (MBE) REVIEW 490 (Aspen
Publishers, 2008) ("MBE Tip: The co-ownership FAPS rules [of tenancy by the entirety] are
heavily tested on the MBE.").
441. See generally John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the

Common-Law MaritalEstate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35 (1997).
442. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51-53 (1980); Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951) (citing Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934)).
443. See Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839) ("This rule is founded upon
the deepest and soundest principles of our nature. Principles which have grown out of those
domestic relations that constitute the basis of civil society and which are essential to the
enjoyment of that confidence which should subsist between those who are connected by the
nearest and dearest relations of life. To break down or impair the great principles which protect
the sanctities of husband and wife would be to destroy the best solace of human existence.");

Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51-53 (quoting Stein with approval); Blau, 340 U.S. at 334; Wolfle, 291
U.S. at 14; see also Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1958), overruled by
Trammel, 445 U.S. 40.
444. See sources cited in Zaher, supra note 438, at 480-86.
445. See Tobias, supra note 439; Weaver, supra note 439.
446. See Orth, supra note 441.
447. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Enron, DOMA4, andSpousal Privileges: Rethinking the
MarriagePlot, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 725 (2012) ("[T]he attorney might argue that any
couple in a marriage-like relationship, including unmarried heterosexual couples, should be
able to secure the benefits of [these] evidentiary privileges. Of course, even these arguments
are still variations on the marriage plot. But one can imagine other plots that do not use
marriage as the measuring stick for determining what relationships are deserving of protection.
For example, one might argue that familial groupings should be entitled to privileges. There
could be an evidentiary privilege for siblings, or for the parent-child relationship.").
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unity to such sundry arrangements, leaving those limited to marriage isolated
and increasingly disused. 448

Courts grappling with privilege when companies combine face
analogous complexities. In the adversarial context prior to a merger
agreement, it is difficult to discern a unifying principle establishing when
information-sharing will enjoy privilege protections. 449 Even after an
agreement is executed, jurisdictions differ on the extent of common interest
available as the combining companies navigate regulatory challenges or
even once combined. 45 0 Given that the road to marriage is rarely without
quarrel, courts will also be called on to distinguish when parties' interests
diverge, or even become adversarial, and determine who holds the reins on
waiver. 451 And when the parties break off their engagement and resort to
litigation, adjudicating the persistence and application of privilege between
now-warring parties will be challenging. 45 2 Even the theoretical certitude of
a written common interest agreement may be subject to ambiguity and
dispute. 45 3

Responding in part to such challenges, a leading academic voice in
privilege law, Professor Grace M. Giesel, has called for the common interest
privilege to be abolished generally. 45 4 She would prescribe that if multiple
parties wish to enjoy privilege, they must engage the same legal team as coclients. 455 Such a restriction would certainly create a blackline rule for
establishing privilege, and conveniently leverages the ethical duties of the
legal profession to ensure the parties' interests actually coincide sufficiently
for a single attorney to represent all. 456 (Of course, dependence on attorneys'

448. Id.
449. See supra Sections II.B, III.C.
450. See supra Sections IIID, IIIE, III.F.
451. See supra Part IV.
452. See supra Part V.
453. See supra Part VI.
454. See generally Giesel, supra note 17. Needless to say, Giesel is not alone in
questioning the workability of modern common interest privilege, though others have
recommended strengthening rather than abolishing it as the solution. See, e.g., Schaffzin, supra
note 17.
455. Giesel, supra note 17, at 558-6 1.
456. Id. at 481 ("Indeed, the nature of joint representation and the ethical constraints on
any attorney handling a joint representation make application of the privilege relatively
straightforward."); id. at 512-19; Blau v. Harrison (In re JP Morgan Chase & Co. Sec. Litig.),
No. 06-C-4674, 2007 WL 2363311, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2007) ("If Defendants' argument
holds true, nothing would prevent a single attorney from representing both the buyer and the
seller in a real estate transaction, for example. The reason such a situation does not occur and
is most likely ethically prohibited is that the buyer and seller maintain opposite legal
positions with respect to the transaction.").
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professional rectitude may occasionally fall short of achieving the desired
surety. 45 7) But such a regime would presumably result in fewer companies
taking that route and thus enjoying the aegis of privilege. 458
How much then does common interest privilege really matter to
merging companies? By the lights of the New York Court of Appeals, not
much:
There is no evidence, for example, that mergers, licensing
agreements and other complex commercial transactions have not
occurred in New York because of our State's litigation limitation on
the common interest doctrine ... Put simply, when businesses share
a common interest in closing a complex transaction, their shared
interest in the transaction's completion is already an adequate
incentive for exchanging information necessary to achieve that end.
Defendants have not presented any evidence to suggest that a
corporate crisis existed in New York over the last 20 years when
our courts restricted the common interest doctrine to pending or
anticipated litigation, and we doubt that one will occur as a result of
our decision today.45 9
But the court of appeals asks the wrong question; one may as well
question how many couples would opt against matrimony absent marital
privileges. 460 The value of privilege here lies not in whether its application is
dispositive of corporate strategic decision-making, but in fostering an
atmosphere of frankness, forthrightness, and open lines of communication
that is important to both corporate and personal marriages. 46' Forcing

457. See, e.g., Eureka Inv. Corp. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 743 F.3d 932, 935-38 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (per curiam).
458. See Fischer, supra note 17; Giesel, supra note 17, at 545-51; Kapnick & Rosen,
supra note 8, at 550-52, 555.
459. Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 27 N.Y.3d 616, 628-29
(N.Y. App. Div. 2016).
460. The answer, presumably, is very few, if any. Cf Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal
Privilege and the Meaning ofMarriage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045, 2093-96 (1995) (examining ex
ante rationales for marital privilege).
461. Compare Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980), and Wolfle v. United
States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) ("The basis of the immunity given to communications between
husband and wife is the protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the
preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to the
administration of justice which the privilege entails."), and Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
209, 223 (1839), with Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 311
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (arguing privilege yields openness and frankness between merging
companies), and OXY Res. Cal. LLC v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 621, 626-27 (Cal. Ct.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss2/3

72

Sunshine: The Secrets of Corporate Courtship and Marriage: Evaluating Commo
2017]

COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE IN MERGERS

373

companies or spouses to decide between candor and confidentiality is a
prescription for dissembling, discord, and ultimately the dissolution of more
unions. 462 That intolerable dilemma, after all, is the chief rationale for the
marital privilege itself.463 In matrimony, society has wisely preferred the
stability of civil marriages over the inquisition of outsiders. 464 Courts too

have often chosen to encourage gainful business combinations by protecting
the confidences that foster their formation 465 -even when they do not
ultimately succeed.4 66 Failure to protect a developing combination's secrets
can only make the combination's failure more likely 467 : "Deal lawyers

create a large amount of potentially privileged information, and cases
[seeking to enjoin mergers] can be won or lost based on whether such
documents are successfully withheld as privileged." 468
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Whatever the administrative difficulties of common interest privilege, it
is too late to readily roll back its protections for companies wholesale. 469

App. Feb. 11, 2004) (citing same). See also Fischer, supra note 17, at 638-39 (discussing
value of common interest).

462. Compare Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 334 (1951) ("Petitioner's refusal to
betray his wife's trust therefore was both understandable and lawful. We have no doubt that he
was entitled to claim his privilege."), and Stein, 38 U.S. at 223, with Hewlett-Packard, 115
F.R.D. at 311 (finding no privilege between companies will lead to more lawsuits between
them), and Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 329, 336-

337 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014), rev'd, 27 N.Y.3d 616 (N.Y. 2016). See also Fischer, supra note
17, at 638-39 (discussing same dilemma); Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 555
("Corporations should not have to choose between maintaining privileges and effective
conduct of their affairs.").

463. See Blau, 340 U.S. at 333-34; Stein, 38 U.S. at 223; see also Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74, 77-78 (1958), overruled by Trammel, 445 U.S. at 43-44.
464. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51-53; Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14; Stein, 38 U.S. at 223; see
also Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 77.
465. Compare supra Sections II.B, III.C, with supra Sections IIID, III.E.
466. See supra Part V.
467. See sources cited supra note 462.
468. Olson, Varallo & Koch, supra note 70, at 901.
469. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 277 ("The conceptual critique of the common interest
privilege probably comes too late. Only a sweeping Supreme Court ruling that the many cases
which have recognized the validity of some forms of common interest privilege have
overreached would now serve to undo the concept and the cases that have recognized it.").
Contra Giesel, supra note 17, at 489 ("Finally, abolishing privilege for the allied lawyer
situation does not undo centuries of legal precedent. Rather, the application of privilege to the
allied lawyer situation is a creature of recent origin. Only four cases applied the privilege to
the allied lawyer setting before 1965. Only in the last three decades have claims of privilege in
the allied lawyer situation become common and problematic. By abolishing the privilege for
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Many thousands of court decisions and commentators have applied and
discussed the doctrine, 470 and even more litigants have depended on its
protections. 471 Nor is there compelling reason to fear its application; courts
have proven admirably prudent in pruning back corporate overreach that
may shield corruption or wrongdoing, whilst maintaining the core ability for
companies to confidentially consult with counsel when they combine. 472 As
the court in Hewlett-Packardwrote:
Unless it serves some significant interest courts should not create
procedural doctrine that restricts communication between buyers
and sellers, erects barriers to business deals, and increases the risk
that prospective buyers will not have access to important
information that could play key roles in assessing the value of the
business or product they are considering buying. Legal doctrine that
impedes frank communication between buyers and sellers also sets
the stage for more lawsuits, as buyers are more likely to be
unpleasantly surprised by what they receive. By refusing to find
waiver in these settings courts create an environment in which
businesses can share more freely information that is relevant to their
transactions. This policy lubricates business deals and encourages
more openness in transactions of this nature. 473
The bench regularly pronounces that promoting candor amongst clients
and counsel is the principal purpose of common interest privilege and the
most compelling of rationales. 474 "At a time and in an age where

the allied lawyer situation, courts would simply be making a correction to a recently taken
jurisprudential wrong turn.").
470. See, e.g., Drumright & Griffin, supra note 41, at 41-43; King, supra note 8, at 1424
& n.73; Schaffzin, supra note 17, at 52-53 n.7.
471. See Buzzetta, supra note 176 (discussing reliance issues arising from Ambac's
retraction of a broader view of common interest in New York); cf Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Does the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis Require Adherence to the
Supreme Court's CurrentDoctrine of Stare Decisis, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1165, 1172-2000 (2008)
(explaining factors involved in departures from stare decisis, including reliance).
472. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 277 (noting courts have "resisted the attempts" of
litigants to unduly expand the privilege); id. at 294 (discussing cases); see, e.g., In re
Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 382 (3d Cir. 2007); Nidec v. Victor Co. of Japan,
249 F.R.D. 575, 579 (N.D. Cal. 2007); OXY Res. Cal. LLC v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d
621, 626-27 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2004).
473. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 311 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (emphasis added).
474. E.g., United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815 (7th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The need to protect the free
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transactions and the litigation they produce are increasingly complex,"4 75
companies "simply cannot obtain such advice if their attorneys must proceed
in splendid isolation."4 76 In the jurisprudential medicine cabinet, sunlight
may be the best disinfectant,4 77 but privilege is the best lubricant. 478 Yet
privilege will scarcely serve that purpose if its protections are uncertain. 479
More rigorously consistent understanding and application of common
interest privilege throughout the process when companies combine best
serves economy of both commercial and judicial deliberations. 48 0

flow of information from client to attorney logically exists whenever multiple clients share a
common interest about a legal matter.").
475. Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Noonan Transp., No. 970325, 2000 WL 3317004, at *7
(Mass. Super. Nov. 16, 2000).
476. Id.; see also King, supra note 8, at 1433-34 (expressing the same sentiment).
477. Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER
PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933)).

478. See Hewlett-Packard, 115 F.R.D. at 311; accord Ctr. Partners, Ltd. v. Growth Head
GP, LLC, 981 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. 2012); OXY Res. Cal. LLC v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d
621, 626-27 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2004).
479. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 409 (1998); Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981); Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 552 (noting
certainty issue in transactional common interest); Schaffzin, supra note 17 (studying certainty
issue in common interest context).
480. See Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072, 1142-43
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012) (evaluating whether punctilious enforcement of
NDAs and JDAs in merger negotiations is beneficial or deleterious to commercial society);
Kapnick & Rosen, supra note 8, at 555 (proponing economy of privilege in merger
discussions); King, supra note 8, at 1442; see also In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 603
(N.D. Tex. 1981) (quoting Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16,
1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)) ("The assurance of confidentiality is as
important and appropriate where a cooperative program of joint defense is helpful or necessary
to represent clients whose attorneys are separately retained as it is where co-defendants have
engaged common counsel. No policy served by the privilege is disserved by recognition of the
joint defense privilege. And its recognition makes savings in expense and effort likely.").
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